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LEGAL ASPECTS OF RENEGOTIATION*

Charles W. Steadman t

T

HE Renegotiation Act 1 which became effective April 2 8, I 942,
was designed to eliminate and remove exorbitant profits from
war contracts. No other recent statute has been the subject of so much
controversy and misunderstanding/! Since the beginning of renegotiation of contracts in the late summer and early fall of r 942, policies have
been crystalizing and many interpretations of the act have been made,
but many more questions as to its meaning must still be answered.
It is not the intention to discuss here the economics of renegotiation,
but rather to deal with the problems of law which it raises. Nevertheless, the background of the statute as well as a statement of the purposes
of renegotiation and the organization for its administration are of importance to this discussion. Renegotiation is a method of profit limitation. As an instrument for the procurement of war material at fair
prices, it arose from the idea that a limit;:ttion of profit on war contracts

*
t

Any opinions set forth in this article are those of the author and are not official
expressions of the War Department.
Major, Ordnance Department; Chief of the Legal Branch of the War Department, Cleveland Ordnance District, since 1940, and legal adviser to the Price Adjustment Board of the Cleveland Ordnance District. A.B., University of Nebraska; LL.B.,
Harvard.
A previous article by Major Steadman dealing with renegotiation appeared in
the August issue of the REvrnw; early publication is planned for a third article by
this author on the same topic.-Ed.
1 Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act,
1942, Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved April 28, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 226
at 245, as amended by § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 982; by the Military Appropriation Act, 1944, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., 1st sess., approved July 1, 1943; and
by Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., 1st sess., approved July 14, 1943.
2 Emery, "[Renegotiation] Will Prove Brake on Efficient Business," RoTARIAN,
January, 1943, p. 28; Flynn, "'Cost-Plus', a World War Evil, Returns," BARRON'S,
August 3 I, 1942, p. 3, reprinted in READER'S DIGEST, October, 1942, p. 108 as
"'Cost-Plus' and Red Tape Hamper War Production"; Lawrence, "Management Faces
More Headaches Over Contracts," WASHINGTON ToDAY (Syndicated Column), September I, 1942.
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was essential to promote the national morale and to prevent infl.ation.3
Some profit limitation measure became necessary because of the enormous size of the armament program which had to be set in motion with
but littfe experience in the mass production of war g~ods and without
reliable cost information. Under these circumstances little opportunity
existed to gauge the fairness of prices.4 This resulted in the creation of
excessive profits in many instances.
Renegotiation also came from a brand of thought which rested upon
the concept that without an incentive to reduce costs, efficiency could
not be promoted in the face of a high excess profits tax such as is necessary to finance war.5 The Vinson-Trammel Act,6 which preceded the
Renegotiation Law as a profit limitation measure, provided for a
fixed percentage of profit limitation. 7 The proponents of renegotiation
3 Patterson, "Renegotiation, What It Is, What It Does, How It Works," DuN's
REVIEW, January, 1943, pp. 8, 9, IO. See Report of War Policies Commission, H.R.
Doc. 163, 72nd Cong., 1st sess. See also, Hearings Before the House Committee on
Military Affairs on H.R. 3 and H.R. 5293, 74th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 590-598 (January 1935). Forrestal, James V., in United States Congress, Hearings before the House
Committee on Naval Affairs on H.R. 6790, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. ·2493 (March 29,
1942); Seidman, "influence of Excess Profits Taxation on Business Policy," FINANCING THE WAR, (a symposium published by the Tax 'Institute, University of Pennsylvania) 51 (1942); Walsh, David I., chairman, in United States Congress, Hearings
before Senate Committee oh Naval Affairs, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (part 1), January 26February 4, 1942, p. 4; Reynolds, Robert R., April 7, 1942, 88 CoNG. REc. 3391;
Wigglesworth, Richard B., April 21, 1942, 88 CoNG. REc. 3586.
4 Additional Report of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense
Program (Truman Committee), 78th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rep. No. 10, part 5, March
30, 1943; 28 FED. REs. BuL., April, 1942, p. 292; National City Bank of New
York publication on.EcoNOMIC CoNDITIONs, GovERNMENT FINANCE, UNITED STATES
SECURITIES, April, 1942, p. 43; see Bunker's remarks of April 3, 1942 in 88 CoNG.
REc. 3317-3318; "1¾ Billion by Renegotiation," BusINESS WEEK, January 9, 1943,
p. 15; Report of Special Committee on Investigation of Munitions Industry, 74 Cong.,
2d sess., S. Rep. No. 944, part I, p. 9.
5 Patterson, Robert P., Statement i,n Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee
on Finance on§ 403 of Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., September 29 and 30, 1942;
Karker, "Profits But No Profiteering," RoTARIAN, January, 1943, p. 26; Seidman,
"Influence of Excess Profits Taxation on Business Policy," FINANCING THE WAR,
(a symposium published by the Tax Institute, University of Pennsylvania) 51 at 69
(1942).
6 Act of March 27, 1934, 48 Stat. L. 503; amended by act 6£ June 25, 1936,
49 Stat. L. 1926 and Act of April 3, 1939, 53 Stat. L. 555; 34 U. S. C. § 496
(1940).
7 The Vinson-Trammel Act originally provided for a limitation of profits on
the construction of nav~ vessels and naval aircraft to ten per cent of the contract price.
This limitation was altered in April, 1939, so th9t the ten per cent limitation applied
only to naval vessels, and a profit of twelve per cent of the contract price became the
limi,tation permitted for Army and Navy aircraft. The profit limitations were later
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did not believe that a fixed percentage of profit limitation was satisfactory.8 Hence the Renegotiation Act delegates to the Secretaries of
the War, Navy and Treasury Departments, to the Chairman of the
Maritime Commission, and to the Boards of Directors of the Defense
Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation and Rubber Reserve Company,9 the authority to determine
what are excessive profits in relation to the individual producer and to
eliminate them through recapt1.1;re or reduction in contract prices, as
provided in the statute.
At the time the law was passed, the Government's contracting officers were following the practice of requesting price reductions from
contractors whenever it was found that the contract prices were too high.
The obligation to procure war goods, which has been imposed upon
the procurement agencies of the government, carries with it an obligation to procure at fair and reasonable prices. The Second War Powers
Act 10 gave contracting officers the right to inquire into contract costs
and such inquiries were being made. 11 But Congress believed that something more was required-thus renegotiation.
Administrative Organization. The task of administering the Renegotiation Act is a vast undertaking. It is estimated that there are
about 25,000 companies within the scope of the law as presently
(June 28, 1940) reduced to eight per cent of the contract price for naval vessels, Army
and Navy Aircraft, and the effect of the act was extended to subcontractors.
8 Patterson, "Renegotiation, What It Is, What It Does, How It Works," DuN's
REVIEW, January, 1943, p. IO.
9 Section 1, Act of July 1, 1943, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., 1st sess., amended
The Renegotiation Act, subsec. 403(a) and added subsec. (k) so as to include contracts
with the Defense Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation, and Rubber Reserve Company within the scope of this law. Prior to this
time contracts and subcontracts with these four subsidiaries of Reconstruction Finance
Corporation were not subject to renegotiation. The text of this latest amendment
reads as follows:
":Provided further, That clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of section 403
of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, I 942, as amended,
are amended to read as follows:
"'Sec. 403 (a) For the purposes of this section" '1. The term 'Department' means the War Department, the Navy Department,
theTreasury Department, the Maritime Commission, Defense Plant Corporation, Metals
Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation, and Rubber Reserve Company, respectively.' "
10 Pub. L. 507, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved March 27, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 176.
11 This was being carried on pursuant to Executive Order No. 9217, signed April
IO, 1942, issued under the Second War Powers Act, 1942, Pub. L. 507, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., approved March 27, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 176.
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drawn.12 The departments decided to handle this job through the use
of their existing organizations with the addition of what are known as
Price Adjustment Boards which would be a part of the departments'
procurement branches or associated with those branches. 13 It was
thought that the act would be administered best if the boards were
selected from the professions and business, so that they would be composed of men conversant with industrial and business problems.
The War Department organized in Washington the War Department Price Adjustment Board.14 This is the central board for coordinating and determining the renegotiation policies within that department.
This board handles directly very few cases. Following the establishment of the War Department Price Adjustment Board the Undersecretary of War directed that authority be ,delegated to the- Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, then Headquarters
Services of Supply and to the Army Air Force Materiel Command, and

✓

12 Mr. Maurice Karker, Chairman, War Department Price Adjustment Board,
in Hearings before the House Naval Affairs Committee, 78th Cong., 1st se,s., pursuant
to H. Res. 30, p. ·1004, June 30, 1943, stated that the total number of contracts and
subcontracts subject to renegotiation "will probably not exceed 25,000 and that the
figure may even be substantially less." An estimate made by the Truman Committee
(see Report of Special Committee investigating the National Defense Program, 78th
Cong., 1st sess., S. Rep. No. 10, part 5, p. 7) placed the number of contractors subject
to the act' at 85,000. Mr. Karker points out, however, in Hearings before the House
Naval Affairs Committee, 78th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to H. Res. 30, at p. 1004,
thd:
.
"It is understood that only approximately 85,000 names are listed in Thomas'
Register of Manufacturers which pui:ports to include all of the manufacturing companies
in the United States with any substantial production. Inquiry discloses that the records
of the Department of Commerce indicate that there are 85,000 contracts of more than
$50,000, and the 'Statistics Division of the War Production Board has stated that these
contracts are being performed in 13,700 plants. l 93 9 Census of Manufacturers shows
only 95,187 manufacturing _corporations then having annual sales in excess of even
the low volume of $5,000. The Internal Revenue Bureau estimates that there are
approximately 86,ooo.manufacturing concerns in the country, and that 40,00 to 50,000
of these have annual sales of less than $ 100,000."
13 W.P.B. Release No. 1017, April 30, 1942.
14 The statute provides that the authority and discretion conferred upon the secretary of each department named "may be delegated, in whole or in part, by him to such
individuals or agencies" as he may designate in his department or in any other department with the consent of the secretary of that department, and he may authorize such
individuals or agencies to make further delegation of such authority and discretion.
Subsection (f) of§ 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation
Act, 1942, Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved April 28, 1942, 56 Stat. L.
226 at 245, amended by§ 801 o'f the Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 982, and § I, Act of July I,
1943, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong., 1st sess. The Renegotiation Act will be cited hereinafter: "Section 403, as amended."
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in turn these services were directed to establish price adjustment boards
and sections throughout the organization for the administration of the
law. The renegotiation activities of the Army Service Forces in being
conducted through the various branches of that service are largely on a
decentralized basis. This is also true, but to a somewhat lesser degree,
with the Army Air Force Materiel Command.
At the $ame time that the War Department Price Adjustment
Board was organized, the Navy Department set up a Navy Department
Price Adjustment Board which is the Navy's central board and has its
headquarters in Washington. This board not only determines policy but
directly handles cases. In fact the majority of the cases in the Navy
Department were dealt with originally by this board. Recently, however, the Navy has undertaken some decentralization of activities and
established boards in New York, Chicago and San Francisco. The Price
Adjustment Boards of the Maritime Commission and the Treasury Department are similar in nature and have centralized their activities in
Washington. The War Shipping Administration has also set up a price
adjustment procedure for renegotiation of contracts. 15
The four subsidiaries of the R. F. C. which have recently been
given renegotiating authority have now established a board in Washington for conducting renegotiation.
How a Case is Handled. The function of the renegotiation boards is
15
The War Shipping Administration derives its legal authority for the establishment of the War Shipping Administration Price Adjustment Board and the exercise
of authority under the Renegotiation Act from certain Executive Orders establishing
the War Shipping Administration as well as from the act itself. Executive Order No.
9054, dated February 7, 1942, established the War Shipping Administration. This
Executive Order was amended by Executive Order 9244, dated September I 6, 1942,
the purpose of which was to clarify the functions and duties of the War Shipping Administration. The functions that had been performed·by the War Shipping Administration prior to its being constituted as a separate branch of the Executive Department
within the office _of Emergency Management had been performed by the Maritime
Commission under powers given it. One of the functions of the Maritime Commission
specifically transferred to the War Shipping Administration by Executive Order 9054
were the activities and functions, duties and powers conferred upon the Maritime Commission by§ 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942,
Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 56 Stat. L. 226. The activities of the Maritime
Commission which were transferred to the War Shipping Administration upon its
establishment by authority of title 1 of the First War Powers Act of 1941, Pub. L, 354,
77th Cong., 1st sess., 55 Stat. L. 838, which authorizes the President to transfer any
duties or powers from one existing department to another branch or agency. With
respect to this matter see the Opinion of the General Counsel of the War Shipping
Administration under date of June 26, 1943 relative to the authority for the establishment of the War Shipping Administration Price Adjustment Board.
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to review the prices and profits of those companies that art assigned to
them. The company or producer, generally referred to as the contractor, is ordinarily assigned for renegotiation to that department and to
the branch within that department with which it does the greatest
amount of its business. For example, if a contractor does the preponderance of his business with the Ordnance Department, which is a part·
of the Army Service Forces and a .branch of the War Department, he
will'be assigned to an Ordnance District Price Adjustment B9ard for
renegotiation. That board will then conduct renegotiation for all the
other departments and services concerned. This is under an agreement
between the various secretaries.16
After a contractor is assigned to one ~f the boards, he is notified
and is asked to submit certain financial inform,ation, as well as data concerning sales for the fiscal year being considered. Profits from those
sales and statements which will reflect the general efficiency of the contractor's operations, as well as the risk which he has assuI}led, are also
requested. It should be remembered that even though renegotiation '
is conducted on an overall basis in that all of the contractor's contracts
are considered as a group,11 in reality the search is made into the fairness
of the contractor's prices. Profits are examined as a short-cut to determine fair prices, it being the conceRt of the act that if profits are exorbitant prices are too high.
The information submitted by the contracto~ is studied carefully.
A).though audits are seldom conducted, the contractor must be able to
support his statements with facts and figures. The data which he submits for renegotiation is his representation and not that of the Government. The contractor must be especially careful that the data which he
submits is accurate. If the statement of his earnings is based upon estimates it should be disclosed as an estimate, and the method of making
such estimates should be carefully stated; otherwise the contractor may
be in the position of making misrepresentations to the Government and
encounter penalties specified in subsection ( e) of the Renegotiation
Act.18
,
16

Delegation of authority pursuant to subsec. (f) of § 403, January 19, 1943.
Subsection (c) (1) of§ 403.
18
Subsectio~ (e) of§ 403, 56. Stat. L. 226 at 246, provides:
"(e) In addition to the powers conferred by existing law, the Secretary of each
Department shall have the right to demand of any contractor who holds contracts with
respect to which the provisions of this section are' applicable in an aggregate amount
in excess of $100,000, statements of actual c5>sts of production and such other financial
statements, at such times and.in such form and detail, as such Secretary may require.
17
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After this information is analyzed, the contractor is asked to confer
with the board to which he has been assigned or its representatives.
Thereafter the board makes a determination as to whether there are
present in the company's earnings what the statute calls "excessive
profits." If such profits do exist the board either takes action to eliminate them or recommends to the responsible officials what profit limitation should be imposed upon such earnings for the fiscal year which has
been under consideration. The board undertakes to negotiate an agreement with the contractor embodying the terms of its fini:l.ings. The
agreement may call for a refund if it is determined that the profits are
excessive, or it may grant the contractor a clearance for the fiscal year
which has been renegotiated if it is found that the profits are not excessive. These agreements are final and constitute a binding undertaking
on the part of the Government and the contractor.
THEORY OF THE LAW

The statute declares a policy against the creation and retention of
excessive or exorbitant profits derived from high prices in war contracts. It contemplates that these excessive profits shall be determined
and eliminated. through the exercise of administrative discretion. Admittedly, if this were a tax statute, a law designed to raise revenue for
the United States, as it has frequently though erroneously been thought
to be,19 the Renegotiation Law would have introduced a new theory for
the determination of excess profits. But this is not a tax statute. It is a
law concerned with the problems of profit limitation, problems of
"excessive profits." Its primary function is not to raise revenue but to
implement the procurement activities of the Government. Congress
adverted to the possibility of accomplishing this aim through taxation
and rejected this method. 20
Any person who wilfully fails or refuses to furnish any statement required of him under
this subsection, or who knowingly furnishes any such statement containing information
which is false or misleading in any material respect, shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than two
years, or both. The powers conferred by this subsection shall be exercised in the case
of any contractor by the Secretary of the Department holding the largest amount of
such contracts with such contractor, or by such Secretary as may be mutually agreed
to by the Secretaries concerned. 1'
19 Withrow, "The Control of War Profits in the United States and Canada," 91
UNiv. PA. L. REv. 194 at 214-215 (1942).
20
George, Walter F., April 23, 1942, in 88 CoNG. REc. 3659. Paul, Randolph
E., Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury, in U. S. Congress, House Committee
on Naval Affairs, Hearings on H.R. 6790, 77th Cong., 2d sess. March 25, 1942, pp.
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The act created no objective formula for determining excessive
profits. It has been contended that no formula should govern in as
much as a formula would prevent the consideration of the varying and
different circumstances under which producers operate. The flexibility
of the law is said to make possible its fair application. 21 The statute
prescribes the standard of reasonableness in the determination of what
is fair and the determination of what is a fair profit and what is an excessive profit is left to administrative decision.
CoNSTITUTIONAL IssuEs
No one disagrees with the proposition that excessive profits ought
to be eliminated from war contracts. As a matter of law, however, the
question raised is whether Congress has selected a constitutional means
for achieving_this end. The answer appears to lie primarily in issues of
impairment of contractual obligations.
Impairment of Obligations of Contracts. The first problem arising
in this regard is whether the law impairs the obligation of contracts.
This question breaks itself into three distinct: facets in relation to (a)
contracts entered into after the pa~sage of the statute which contain the
so-called renegotiation clause, (b) those contracts entered into after the
passage ·of the statute which do not contain such a clause and ( c) contracts in effect before passage of the statute.
·
Virtually all prime and subcontracts entered into after the passage
of the statute contain a clause providing for renegotiation as directed by
the act. The parties having agreed to renegotiate, there appears no
doubt as to the right of the Government to enforce the agreement in
these contracts. But contracts undoubtedly have been made, after the
act became effective, which do not contain the renegotiation clause.
Contracts entered into directly or indirectly with the departments covered by the law are subject to renegotiation whether incorporating a
renegotiation clause or not,. for the P!ovisions of the Renegotiation Act
make it effective with regard to all such contracts.22 The doctrine of
adoption of existing law into a contract is wholly applicable here. The
parties having made their contracts after the passage of the law which
purports to affect such agreements, must have included the purport of
2741-3. For similar points of view see Patterson, Robert P., id., March 19, 1942,
p. 2479; Nelson, Donald M., id., March 24, 1942, p. 2614; Ball, Joseph H., April
7, 1942, in 88 CoNG. REc. 3395-3396.
21 Patterson, "Renegotiation, What It Is, What It Does, How It Works," DuN's
REVIEW, January, 1943, p. IO.
22
Subsection ( c) ( 6) of § 403, as amended.
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such statute in their undertakings. 23 The right to renegotiate becomes
one of the terms of the contract and this would be true whether the
parties knew the United States had such a right or not. In College
Point Boat Corporation v. United States,24 the United States Supreme
Court affirmed this position. There the claimant and the Navy Department had made a contract for the delivery of mats. After the Armistice
was signed, the Navy told the company that the mats would probably
not be needed and suggested that it cease manufacturing these items.
The company was asked to submit a proposal for the cancellation of the
contract, which had been made after the passage of a statute which contained a provision giving the United States the right to cancel contracts.
In holding that the stoppage of performance was an anticipatory breach,
the Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
" ... The United States actually did have an unconditional
right of cancellation. For the contract was made pursuant to the
Act of June 15, 1917, c. 29, 40 Stat. 182. By virtue of the statutory provision as was later held in Russell Motor Co. v. United
States, 261 U. S. 514, the right to cancel became, by implication,
one of the terms of the contract. But, so far as appears, neither
party knew that the United States had such a right...." 25
As applied to the question at hand it seems difficult to support any
position other than the one arrived at by the Court. Even though the
adoption of the statute into the contract may involve a fiction,26 reasons
of public interest seem to outweigh any suggestion that would make it
possible to contract away the policy as declared by Congress, designed
for the protection of the general public and especially to forward the
prosecution of the war.
Is the Act Unconstitutional as Applied to Contracts Entered Into
Prior to its Effective Date, April 28, r942? It seems quite clear that
the war powers of Congress are sufficiently broad to permit the constitutional enactment of the Renegotiation Law.21 This is patently- true
in view of the critical effect of prices on domestic morale and expanded
23

3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 615 (1936).
267 U.S. 12, 45 S. Ct. 199 (1925).
25
Id. at p. 15. Cf. 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 615, note 13 (1936).
20
1.67 U.S. 12, 45 S. Ct. 199 (1925).
27
United States Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, clauses I, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 16. See
Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U.S. 253, 49 S. Ct. 314 (1929);
United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 51 S. Ct. 571 (1931); cf. Block v. Hirsch,
256 U.S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458 (1921). See Hughes, "The Fighting Powers of the
United States Under the Constitution," 55 CoNG. REc., Part 8, App. 551, 553 (1917).
24
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production caused by modern war. That the act is constitutional with
regard to its powers and scope, in general, does not, however, automatically make it immune from attack on constitutional grounds in specific cases. Here a question arises as to whether the Renegotiation Act
may be constitutionally applied to contracts that were in existence at the
time it became e:ffective. The act attempts to gather under its cloak
not only all contracts made after its passage but also those made before
its enactment where final payment had not been made. 28
The case of Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 20 made it perfectly clear that private parties cannot prohibit Congress from the exercise of a_ power having to do with the accomplishment of an instrument
of national policy. Speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, the
Court said, "There is no constitutional ground for denying to the Congress the power expressly to prohibit and invalidate contracts although
previously made, and valid when made, when they interjere with the
ca,:rying out of the policy it is free to adopt." 30 The Court, in this case,
it will be remembered, was dealing with the application of the statute
' which prohibited payment of obligations in gold.31 The railroad had
agreed to pay its bonds in gold coin of given weight and fineness. The
contract obtained as between private individuals. The court decided
28
Subsection {c) (6) of § 403, as amended. The Joint Statement of the War,
Navy and Treasury Departments and the Maritime Commission of Purposes, Principles,
Policies, and Interpretations of § 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved April 28, 1942,
as amended, published March 31, 1942 by the United States Government Printing
Office, has been revised in relation to § J-PAB-2{a), to read as follows:
"The Departments have adopted the policy that final payment will be considered
to have been made prior to April 28, 1942, if full payment has been made except for
amounts withheld with respect to performance guarantees, penalties, performance
bonuses, (or small disputed items), but if any other amount is unpaid as of April 28,
1942, irrespective of the size .of the amount so unpaid or the reasons for nonpayment,
the entire contract shall be deemed subject to renegotiation although the amount of
the payment due as of April 28, 1942, and the circumstances, if any, relating to tJie
delay in payment will.be given full consideration in determining the amount of excessive profits."
The counsel for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation has interpreted the recent
amendment to § 403, which made subject to the act contracts and subcontracts with
the Defense Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corpora-•
tion, and Rubber Reserve Company{§ 1, Act of July, 1943, Pub. L. 108, 78th Cong.,
1st sess.) to be retroactive. Thus, under this ruling all contracts and subcontracts with
these agencies upon which final payment was not made on or before April 28, 1942,
are also subject to the act.
29
294 U.S. 240, 55 S. Ct. 407 (1935).
so 294 U.S. 240 at 309, 55 S. Ct. 407 (1935). {Italics supplied).
81 Joint Resolution of the Congress, June 5, 1933, 48 Stat. L. 112.
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that the powers of Congress are sufficiently great to permit the ~mpairment of these contractual obligations. This position was taken in full
view of the Fifth Amendment which forbids the abridgement of property rights and hence contract rights without due process of law.82
In Perry v. United States,88 another gold clause case,84 the holder
of a Liberty Bond, issued when gold was in circulation and at a standard
value of a certain weight and fineness, claimed payment in accordance
with the promise set forth in the bond. Pursuant to legislation, the
Government had, however, withdrawn all gold coin from circulation,
prohibited with certain limited exceptions its export or use in foreign
exchange, reduced the weight of gold which represented the standard
dollar, and placed all forms of money on a parity with that standard.
By joint resolution in 1933, Congress declared that such bonds could
be discharged by payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency
which was legal tender for public and private debts. The bondholder,
Perry, demanded currency in an amount exceeding the face of the bond
in the same ratio as that borne by the number of grains in the former
gold dollar to the number in the existing one. He was refused payment
in gold coin of the former standard or in an equal weight of gold, and
the Treasury declined to pay him more than the face of the bond in
currency. He then brought an action in the Court of Claims, and although the court decided that the repudiation by the Government of
the gold clause in the bond was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority, the plaintiff could not recover more than the loss he
had actually suffered. Since Perry was unable to show any actual damage, he was denied recovery. The Court, in holding the joint resolution,
as applied to the Government obligations, unconstitutional,35 gave
82

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; United States v. Central
Pacific R.R. Co., II8 U.S. 235 at 238, 6 S. Ct. 1038 (1886); cf. Sinking Fund Cases,
99 U.S. 700 at 718-719 (1878); United States v. Northern Pacific R.R. Co., 256
U.S. 51 at 64, 41 S. Ct. 439 (1921); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 at 580,
54 S. Ct. 840 (1934). Also see Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall (75 U.S.) 603 at 623,
(1869).
88
•
294 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 432 (1935).
84 Beside the Norman and Perry cases the other Gold Clause Cases were United
States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S. Ct. 407 (1935); Nortz v. United
States, 294 U.S. 317, 55 S. Ct. 428 (1935). All but the Perry case reached the result
of the Norman case.
85 The Court in Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), through Mr. Justice Hughes said at pages 3 50 and 3 5 I:
" ••• The Government's contention thus raises a question of far greater importance
than the particular claim cf the plaintiff. On that reasoning, if the terms of the Government's bond as to the- ~andard of payment can be repudiated, it inevitably follows
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further impetus to the conception that while the Federal Government
may be able to impair, the obligations of contracts as between private
individuals, as in the Norman case, no such power obtains with reference
to obligations of the United States.36 Now, it is important to note this
distinction, for, if it is sound in its application to the Renegotiation Act,
a distinction immediately arises as to the effect of the statute upon prime
contracts between the Government and the contractor on the one hand,
and subcontracts between two private persons on the other. Certainly
the act intended no such distinction, for it specifically defines a "contract" as including subcontracts.87
The difficult question is whether the decisions of the Court compel
prime contracts in this category to be treated differently than subcontracts. At the time that the Perry case was decided it had not been determined that the contractual obligations of the United States were not
subject to regulation by Congress under some circumstances. 88 It seems
that the obligation as to the amount to be paid may also be repudiated. The contention
necessarily imports that the Congress can disregard the obligations of the Government
at its discretion and that, when the Government borrows money, the credit of the
United States is an illusory pledge.
"We do not so read the Constitution. There is a clear distinction between the
power of the Congress to control or interdict the contracts of private parties when they
interfere with the exercise of its constitutional authority, and the power of the Congress
to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money
under the authority which the Constitution confers. In authorizing the Congress to
borrow money, the Constitution empowers the Congress to fix the amount to be borrowed and the terms of payment. By virtue of the power to borrow money 'on the.
credit of the United States,' the Congress is authorized to pledge that credit as an
assurance of payment as stipulated,-as the highest assurance the Government can give,
, its plighted faith. To say that the Congress may withdraw or ignore that pledge, is
to assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise, a pledge having no other
sanction than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor. This Court has given no
sanction to such a conception of the obligations of our Government." (Italics are the
Court's).
86 Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 at 718-719 (1878); United States v. Central
Pacific R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 235 at 238, 6 S. Ct. 1038 (1886); United States v. Northern Pacific Ry Co., 256 U.S. 51 at 64, 41 S. Ct. 439 (1921); and Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571,. 54 S. Ct. 840 (1934); all adhere to this idea. This seems to
have had its beginning in such cases as Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 386 (1798),
involving a private contract; The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 666 at 675,
(1868); Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 603 (1869); Cooke v. United
States, 91 U.S. 389 at 396 (1875). Cf.: State Tax and Foreign Held Bonqs, 15 Wall.
(82 U.S.) 300 at 320 (1872).
37
Subsection (a) (5) of § 403, as amended.
88 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes stated his opinion as though the case involved the
question of whether the contractual obligations of the United States can be completely
abrogated. He said in 294 U.S. 330 at 350 (1935):
'
" ... The Government's contention thus raises a question of far greater importance
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unlikely that the Perry case decided this question. The holding there
appears to be narrowly limited to situations wherein the credit of the
United States has been pledged for money borrowed. Despite the fact
that there is much broad language in the decision 89 a careful review of
the case reveals that the only question before the Court was the regulation by Congress of the use of gold currency in the payment of gold
bonds issued prior to the Joint Resolution. 40 Apart from that there was
no default by the United States.41 The Perry decision moves to its conclusion because of the Court's reluctance to permit Congress to repudiate a pledge of credit since the borrowing of money was involved.42
The limitation upon the doctrine expressed in the majority opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes becomes even more pronounced when
viewed in the light of the concurring opinion of the present Chief Justice who not only took the position that Perry should not recover because he had not suffered any loss but also argued that the Court should
not commit itself to any proposition under which Congress could not
impair its own commitments whether for credit or otherwise.42-a The
than the particular claim of the plaintiff. On that reasoning, if the terms of the Government's bond as to the standard of payment can be repudiated, it inevitably follows
that the obligation as to the amount to be paid may also be repudiated. The contention
necessarily imports that the Congress can disregard the obligations of the Government
at its discretion, and that, when the Government borrows money, the credit of cli.e
United States is an illusory pledge."
89
For example at page 353 of the Perry case, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), the Court
said:
" ... The powers conferred upon the Congress are harmonious. The Constitution
gives to the Congress the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States,
an unqualified power, a power vital to the Government-upon which in an extremity
its very life may depend. The binding quality of the promise of the United States
is of the essence of the credit which is so pledged. Having this power to authorize
the issue of definite obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress has
not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those obligations. The fact that the
United States may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which does
not affect the legal and binding character of its contracts. While the Congress is under
no duty to provide remedies through the courts, the contractual obligation still exists
and, despite infirmities of procedure, remains binding upon the conscience of the
sovereign. Lynch v. United States, supra, pp. 580, 582."
4
For an interesting discussion upon the power of Congress to regulate the obligations of the United States in reference to the gold clause in United States bonds see
Hart, "The Gold Clause in U.S. Bonds," 48 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1069 (1935).
41
Mr. Justice Stone in his concurring opinion said (294 U.S. at 359):
"I do not understand the Government to contend that it is any the less bound by
the obligation than a private individual would be, or that it is free to disregard it except in the exercise of the constitutional power 'to coin money' and 'regulate the value
thereof.' In any case, there is before us no question of default apart from the regulation
by Congress of the use of gold as currency."
42
See note 39 supra.
42
-aln the case of Perry v. United_States, 294 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 432 (1935),
Mr. Justice Stone said at pp. 3 59 and 36 l :
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Perry case, the Sinking Fund Cases,4 2-b United States v. Central Pacific
Ry Co.,4'2 Lynch v. United States,42-d and others of this group 42-e
· rest upon the underlying rationale that once the credit of the United
States has been pledged, Congress is without power to interfere with
the obligation because if Congress is permitted to withdraw the pledge
of th~ United States such action would impair the ability of the Gov-·
ernment to conduct its affairs by destroying the confidence of the people
in the Government's undertakings. Certainly this is the paramount
basis for the Perry decision. It is upon this Feasoning that these cases
are encompassed by the Fifth Amendment. If this is their true basis,
however, were it not for the unusual circumstances of war, it would
seem that the public confidence would be as much destroyed by the
Goverm:nent's disregarding its obligations under war contracts.
, Unless it can be assumed that that canon of constitutional decision
which forbids the determination of a constitutional question upon facts
not presented for judgment is no longer part of our constitutional
paraphernalia,42-f neither the Perry case nor those cases following the
Sinking Fund Cases 42-g are binding precedents in this inquiry since they
-0

"In this posture of the case it is unnecessary, and I think undesirable, for the
Court to undertake to say that the obligation of the gold clause in Government bonds
is greater than in the bonds of private individuals, or that in some situation not described, and in some manner and in some measure undefined, it has imposed restrictions
upon the future exercise of the .power to regulate the currency. I am not persuaded
that we should needlessly intimate any opinion which implies th.at the obligation may
so operate, for example, as to interpose a serious obstacle to the adoption of measures
for stabilization of the dollar, should Congress think it wise to accomplish that purpose ·
by resumption of gold payments, in dollars of the present or any other gold content
less than that specified in the gold clause; and by the re-establishment of a free market '
for gold and its free exportation .•••
"I therefore do not join in so much of the opinion as may be taken to suggest
that the exercise of the sovereign power to borrow money on credit, which does not
override the sovereign immunity from suit, may nevertheless preclude or impede the
exercise of another sovereign power, to regulate the value of money; or to suggest that
although there is and can be no present cause of action upon the repudiated gold clause,
its obligation is nevertheless, in some manner and to some extent, not stated, superior
to the power to regulate the currency which we now hold to be superior to the obligation of the bonds."
42
-b 99 U.S. 700 at 718-719 (1878).
42- 0 I 18 U.S. 235 at 238, 6 S. Ct. 1038 (1886).
42-d 292 U.S. 571, 54 s. Ct. 840 (1934)~
42-e See note 3 6 supra.
42-f Cf. Liverpool N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33 at 39, 5 S. Ct.
352 (1885); United States v. Hamburg American Co."239 U.S. 466 at 475, 36 S. Ct.
212 (1916); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477 at 488, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923);
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440 at 447, 48 S. Ct. 174 (1928). Also see Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 62, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932) on the point of construction for
the purpose of avoiding an unconstitutional result.
42
-g 99 U.S. 700 at 718-719 (1878).
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do not involve circumstances of war. Nor do any of these decisions
hold that there are no instances in which Congress is not empowered to
exercise its regulatory powers in such a way as it deems necessary for
the protection of the public interest. They do not decide that it may
not become more important to permit the free exercise of these regula.tory powers than to require the "punctilious fulfillment of contractual
obligations." 42-h If this analysis is correct then it would seem that Congress is not prohibited from regulating the contracts of the Federal
Government in time of war for the purpose of controlling profits 'and
restraining prices in the procurement of war material. At least this
would appear to be an open question.
There are profound difficulties that acc9mpany any contention that
war circumstances are insufficient to permit the constitutional application of renegotiation to contracts of the Federal Government which
were extant at the time the act was passed. Indeed, when Lynch •v.
United States 42- 1 was decided the Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Brandeis recognized that there were situations to which the protection
of the Fifth Amendment which normally might hold inviolate the
contractual obligations of the Government, could not be extended. The
Court said (p. 579):
"Second. The Fifth Amendment commands that property be
not taken without making just compensation. Valid contracts are
property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a State or the United States. Rights against the United States
arising out of a contract with it are protected by the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Central Pacific R. Co., II8 U.S. 235,238;
United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 256 U.S. 51, 64, 67.
When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights
and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable
to contracts between private individuals. That the contracts of war
risk insurance were valid when made is not questioned. As Congress had the power to authorize the Bureau of War Risk Insurance to issue them, the due process clause prohibits the United
States from annulling them, unless, indeed, the action taken falls
within the federal policy power of some other paramount power."
(Underscoring supplied).·
No better illustration of a situation where the action taken falls
within "some other paramount power" is needed than that found in the
Legal Tender Cases 42-j which arose'out of the Civil War. It is true
42
-h
42- 1

Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840 (1934).
Ibid.
·
42
-j Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457 at 544 (1870).
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that those cases involved an interference by the Federal Government
with private contracts-debts incurred by private contracting parties
prior to the passage of the Legal Tender Acts.42-k Nonetheless, Knox v.
1
Lee and Parker v. Davis, in overruling Hepburn v. Griswold 42 - were
as great a departure, if not a greater departure from prior precedent
than the Renegotiation Act and they are dearly illustrative of the
enormous power conferred upon Congress in order to maintain a war
,economy.42 -m
2
~ -k 12

Stat. L. 345, 532, 709 (1862-1863).
8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 603 (1869).
Mr. Justice Strong rendering the majority opinion for the Court in the Legal
Tender Case, 12 Wall. (70 U.S.) 475 at 540-541 (1870), said:
"We do not propose to dilate at length upon the circumstances in which the
country was placed, when Congress attempted to make treasury notes a legal tender.
They are of too recent occurrence to justify enlarged description. Suffice it to say that.
a civil war was then raging which seriously threatened the overthrow of the government
and the des~ruction of the Constitution itself. It demanded the equipment and support
of large armies and navies, and the employment of money to an extent beyond the
.capacity of all ordinary sources of supply. Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly
empty, and the credit of the government, if not stretched to its utmost tension, had
become nearly exhausted. Moneyed institutions had advanced largely of their means,
and more could not be expected of them. They had been compelled to suspend specie
paymel)ts. Taxation was inadequate to pay even the interest on the debt already incurred, and it was impossible to await the income of additional taxes. The necessity was
immediate and pressing. The army was unpaid. There was then due to the soldiers in
the field nearly a score of millions of dollars. The requisitions from the War and Navy
Departments for supplies exceeded fifty millions, and the current expenditure was over
one million per day. The entire amount of coin in the country, including that in
private hands, as well as that in banking institutioI1.s, was insufficient to supply the need
of the government three months, had it all been ·poured into the treasury. Foreign
credit we had none. We say nothing of the overhanging paralysis of trade, and of
business generally, which threatened loss of confidence in the ability of the government
to"maintain its continued existence, and therewith the complete destruction of all remaining national credit."
At pages 550-551 he said:
"If, then, the legal tender acts were justly chargeable with impairing contract
obligations, they would not, for that reason, be forbidden, unless a different rule is to
be applied to them from that which has hitherto prevailed in the construction of other
p.owers granted by the fundamental law. But, as already intimated, the objection misapprehends the nature and extent of the c.ontract obligation spoken of in the Constitution. As in a state of civil society property of a citizen or subject is,ownershi,P, subject
to the lawful demands of the sovereign, so contracts must be understood as made in
reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of the government, and no
obligation of a contract can extend to the defeat of legitimate government authority."
Mr. Justice Bradley, concurring, sai'1 at page 567:
"I do not say that it is a war power, or that it is only to be called into exercise in
time of war; for other public exigencies may arise in the history of a nation which may
make it expedient and imperative to exercise it. But of the occasions when, and of the
times how long, it shall be exercised and in force, it is for the legislative department
of the government to judge. Feeling sensibly the judgments and wishes of the people,
42 1
42
-m

1944}

RENEGOTIATION OF WAR CONTRACTS

Here in the instance of the application of renegotiation to contracts
existing at the time the act was passed, it is believed that the Court
would be very reluctant to overlook the fact that lack of experience in
the production of war goods and the constant experimentation resulting
from changes arising from battle experience makes it extraordinarily
difficult to achieve fair prices at the outset of any negotiation for war
contracts and that the procurement of war goods at fair and reasonable
prices are of vital importance to the security of the nation at war. Since
the Court has recently said that equity is not sufficient to save the
Government from the payment of exorbitant prices but recourse must
be had to statute,42-n it is not likely that it will disregard the need for
that department cannot long (if it is proper to suppose that within its sphere it ever
can) misunderstand the business interests and just rights of the community."
42
-n United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 315 U.S. 289, 62 S. Ct.
722 ( I 942). The Court' decided that the allegations of the Government were not
supported by evidence. Mr. Justice Black who rendered the opinion for the majority
of the Court said at p. 309:
"The problem of war profits is not new. In this country, every war we have
engaged in has provided opportunities for profiteering and they have been too often
scandalously seized. See Hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs on
H.R. 3 and H.R. 5293, 74th Congress, 1st Sess., 590-598. To meet this recurrent
evil, Congress has at times taken various measures. It has authorized price fixing. It
has placed a fixed limit on profits, or has recaptured high profits through taxation, It
has expressly reserved for the Government the right to cancel contracts after they have
been made. Pursuant to Congressional authority, the Government has requisitioned
existing production facilities or itself built and operated new ones to provide needed
war materials. It may be that one or some or all of these measures should be utilized
more comprehensively, or that still other measures must be devised. But if the Execu- .
tive is in need of additional laws by which to protect the nation against war profiteering, the Constitution has given to Congress, not to this Court, the power to make them."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented, saying at p. 330:
"To deny the existence of duress in a Government contract by ironic reference
to the feebleness of the United States as against the overpowering strength of a single
private corporation is an indulgence of rhetoric in disregard of fact. The United States
with all its might and majesty never makes a contract. To speak of a contract by the
United States is to employ an abstraction. We must not allow it to become a blinding
abstraction. Contracts are made not by 130 million Americans but by some official
on their behalf. Because the national interest is represented not by the power of the
nation but by an individual professing to exercise authority of vast consequence to the
nation, action by Government officials is often not binding against the Government
in situations where private parties would be bound. The contracts here were not made
by an abstraction known as the United States or by the millions of its citizens. For all
practical purposes, the arrangement was entered into by two persons, Bowles and Radford. And it was entered into by them against their better judgment because they had
only Robson's choice--which is no choice. They had no choice in view of the circumstances which subordinated, them and by which they were governed, namely, that ships
were needed, and needed quickly, and Bethlehem was needed to construct them quickly.
The legal alternative--that the Government take over Bethlehem-was not an actual .
alternative, and Bethlehem knew this as well as the representatives of the Government...."
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such an instrument in the proc4rement of war goods.42- 0
Effect of Unconstitutionality Upon Renegotiation Clauses in War
Contracts. In as much as the renegotiation clause has been inserted in
contracts at the direction of the statute, there may be some question as
to whether it would be binding upon ·the parties in the event the act
itself were declared unconstitutional. The courts have made many
statements to the effect that a statute once having been found to be unconstitutional, is, for all effects and purposes, wholly inoperative, conferring no rights· and imposing no duties. 43
An interesting and pertinent case is Cleveland v. Clement Bros.
Construction Co.44 This was an action brought against the city upon a
contract for money due for work done and materials furnished. The
city, in defending the action, undertook to justify the retention of the
amount sued for through a provision that had been inserted in the contract under a statute which provided for eight h~ur work upon public
works. The contract provision penalized the violation of the statute by a
forfeiture of ten dollars for each man worked in a single day for more
than eight hours when there was no emergency. The plaintiff had on
one day worked thirty-two men for more than eight hours when there
was no emergency. The ~efendant's answer was demurred to. The trial
At p. 334 he continued as follows:
"Authority given to make contracts does not imply authority to make unconscionable contracts. Suppose that Congress in authorizing the contracts in question had written into its legislation: 'Provided, that no agency of government shall be authorized
to enter into unconscionable col).tracts.' Can it be that because Congress did not expressly
provide that 'unconscionable contracts' are unauthorized it impliedly sanctioned the
making of 'unconscionable contracts?' Or suppose the estimated costs in the contracts
vyere so inflated by Bethlehem that its profits were 200% rather than 22%. Would
this Court still be bound to enforce these contracts on the ground that Congress had
commanded their enforcement? Surely, Cpngress did not impliedly repeal historic
legal principles and prohibit this Court from exercising its duty to withhold relief
when the particular circumstances disclose an unconscionable arrangement in the making
of which the Government's contracting officers had no practical choice."
At p. 336:
" ..• During wartime the bargaining position of Government contracting officers
is inherently weak, no matter how conscientious they may be." (Italics the Court's).
42- 0 All of the major powers have found it necessary to institute various means of
price control. For survey of foreign price control measures see Hearings before the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 77th Cong., 1st sess. on H.R. 5479
(Price Control Bill), superseded by H.R. 5990, Part I, p. 88. See also, Patterson,
"Renegotiation, What It Is, What It Does, How It Works," DuN's REVIEW, January 1943, pp. 11-12.
,
43 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 at 442, 6 S. Ct. 1121 (1885); Chicago I. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559 at 566, 33 S. Ct. 581 (1912). See Chicot
County District v. Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S. Ct. 317 (1940).
44 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N.E. 885 (1902). Of a similar tenor is People ex Rel.
•
Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 1, 59 N.E. 716 (1901).
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court overruled the demurrer. On appeal to the circuit court, the
judgment was reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed this decision.
The Court held the eight-hour law unconstitutional and stated that
when a statute is declared unconstitutional, stipulations and agreements
required ~ the statute to be inserted in a contract have no obligatory or
binding force on the parties. But the better rule appears to be that even
though a clause is inserted in a contract at the direction of a statute
which is later declared to be unconstitutional, the parties are none the
less bound by their agreement if the contract is not defective for some
other reason and is not itself opposed to public policy. In these cases the
contracts are "upheld generally on the ground of a so-called estoppel." 45
The necessary conclusion seems to be that an agreement to renegotiate which is required in Government supply contracts would remain
in full force even though the statute were declared unconstitutional.
The only ground upon which this position would become unsound,
other than for some fault in the agreement itself, would be that the
45
5 W1LLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1588 (1936); Chicot County District v. Bank, 308 U.S. 371 at 374, 60 S. Ct. 317 (,1940). Daniels v. Tearney, 201
U.S. 415 (1880}; Booth Fisheries v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 271 U.S.
208, 46 S. Ct. 491 (1926). On the analogy of payments made under Renegotiation
to the payment of taxes or assessments voluntarily made under an unconstitutional tax
statute, recovery of any amount voluntarily paid in renegotiation would probably be denied. Carr v. City of Memphis, (C.C.A. 6th, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 678; Yates v. Royal
Insurance Co., 200 Ill. 202, 65 N.E. 726 (1902); Campbell v. Rainey, 127 Cal. App.
747, 16 P. (2d) 310 (1932). See Blumenthal v. United States, (D.C. Cal. 1925)
4 F. ( 2d) 808; Field, "The Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes," 45
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1932); but cf. Cloister Printing Corp. v. United States, (C.C.A.
2d, 1938) IO0 F. (2d) 355 approved in a note in 52 HARV. L. REv. 696 (1939).
In Chicot County District v. Bank, 308 U.S. 371 at 374 (1940), this statement is
significant:
"The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress·having
been found to be unconstitutional was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties. • • . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements
as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,-with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed
to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature
both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusi'{Je statement of a principle of absolute retroacti'{Je in'{Jalidity cannot be justified." (Italics supplied).
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agreement to renegotiate the contract price was not made by the contractor voluntarily. Ordinarily no such possibility would appear, for
almost without exception the contractor does not protest to the inclusion
of the renegotiation clause in Government· supply contracts at the
direction of the statute. But suppose that he does protest. Assume that
he states that he does not believe that the contract should contain the
renegotiation clause, but nevertheless signs the contract. Can it be
claimed under these circumstances that there· is any coercion? It would
seem that there is none,46 even though there is a possibility that if the
contractor refuses to accept a supply contract which includes the renegotiation clause, the Government can take over his plant through the
exercise of its war powers as invoked by Congress in the Selective Train46
Cf. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 3 I 5 U.S. 289, 62 S. Ct.
581 (1941). The counsel for the Government argued in this case that the Bethlehem
Steel Corporation had forced the contracting officers of the United States to sign contracts with the corporation under duress and coercion. Commenting upon this contention, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, said at pp. 300 and 303-304:
"Duress. The word duress implies feebleness on one side, overpowering strength
on the other. Here it is suggested that feebleness is on the side of the Government of
the United States, overpowering strength on the side of a single private corporation.
Although there are many cases in which an individual has claimed to be a victim of
duress in dealings with go\'.ernment, e.g., Union Pacific R. Co. o. Public Service
Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, this, so far as we know, is the first instance in which government has claimed to be a victim of duress in dealings with an individual.~ ••
" ..• We must therefore conclude that the negotiations do not show that Bethlehem
forced the Government's representatives to accept contracts against their will.
"If the negotiations do not establish duress, the Government finds it 'in the circumstances themselves. The petitioner concedes •that the Government could have
commandeered Bethlehem's plants, but it contends that, if the plants had been commandeered, Bethlehem's organization would have been unwilling to serve the Government in them. Heavy reliance is placed on an observation in the Master's report that
'the Government did not have power to compel performance by an unwilling organization.' We shall later consider the alleged lack of power. We now point out that
the alleged unwillingness is an assumption unsupported by findings or evidence. Since
the possibility of commandeering appears not even to have been.suggested to Bethlehem,
we have no basis for knowing what its reaction would have been. We cannot assume
that, if the negotiations failed to produce contracts acceptable to both sides, Bethlehem
would have refused to contribute to the war effort except under legal compusion. We
cannot lightly impute to Bethlehem's whole organization, composed as it was of hundreds of people, such an attitude of unpatriotic recalcitrance in the face of national peril.
"But even if we were to assume, as we do not, an initial attitude of unwillingness,
we do not think that the Government was entirely without means of overcoming it.
For',· the representatives of the Fleet Corporation, an agent of the United States, came
to Bethlehem armed with bargaining powers to which those of no ordinary private
corporation can be compared. If it chose to, the Fleet Corporation could have foregone
all negotiation over price, compelling Bethlehem to undertake the work at a price set
by the President, with the burden of going to court if it considered the compensation
unreasonably low. And the power to commandeer Bethlehem's entire plant and facili-
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ing and Service Act.47 The contractor may rely upon his constitutional
rights surrounding the power of eminent domain; that is, the exercise
of the power must be compensated for by the payment of the fair and
reasonable value of the thing preempted by the Government. This
alternative, however, gives the contractor no profit. Being too speculative, profits from a business cannot be included in damages allowed
under condemnation proceedings.48 Accepting the clause, on the other
hand, offers him an opportunity to make a profit within reasonable
limits if he can; thus, he is given a benefit. If he clutches at the benefit,
ties, in accordance with authority specifically delegated by the President, provided the
Fleet Corporation with an alternative bargaining weapon difficult for any company
to resist." (Italics the Courts's).
47
Section 9, Pub. L. 783, 76th Cong., 3d sess., approved September 16, 1940,
54 Stat. L. 88 5 at 892. See also Pub. L. 274, 77th Cong., 1st sess., approved October
16, 1941, 55 Stat. L. 742, as amended by Second War Powers Act, 1942, Pub. L.
507, 77th Cong., 2d sess., approved March 27, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 176.
48
The United States Supreme Court summarized very well the elements included
in just compensation in the case of Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 S. Ct.
704 (1934). On pp. 255 and 256 there appears the following statement by the Court:
"Just compensation includes all elements of value that inhere in the property, but
it does not exceed market value fairly determined. The sum required to be paid the
owner does not depend upon the uses to which he has devoted his land but is to be
arrived at upon just consideration of all the uses for which it is suitable. The highest
and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be
needed in the reasonably near future is to be considered, not necessarily as the measure
of value, but to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the
market value while the property is privately held. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403,
408. Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Service Commission, 291 U.S. 227. 2 Lewis,
Eminent Domain, 3d ed., § 707, p. 1233. 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 2d ed., §
220, p. 671. The fact that the most profitable use of a parcel can be made only in
combination with other lands does not necessarily exclude that use from consideration
if the possibility of combination is reasonably sufficient to affect market value. Nor
does the fact that it may be or is being acquired by eminent domain negative consideration of availability for use in the public service. New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61.
It is commoIJ. knowledge that public service corporatiQns and others having that power
frequently are actual or potential competitors, not only for tracts held in single ownership but also for rights of way, locations, sites and other areas requiring the union of
numerous parcels held by different owners. And, to the extent that probable demand
by prospective purchasers or condemnors affects market value, it is to be taken into
account. Boom Co. v. Patterson, ubi supra. But the value to be ascertained does not
include, and the owner is not entitled to compensation for any element resulting subsequently to or because of the taking. Considerations that may not reasonably be held
to affect market values are excluded. Value to the taker of a piece of land combined
with other parcels for public use is not the measure of or a guide to the compensation
to which the owner is entitled. New York v. Sage, ubi supra. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 76, 80.•.." (Italics the Court's).
The holding in the case was that as just compensation included no increment
resulting from the taking, plaintiffs were not entitled to elements of value arising from
the prospect that the Government would acquire flowage easements.
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he will be estopped from asserting that the statute is unconstitutional. 49
The contractor thus has a choice and there is no coercion to corrupt the
public policy against excessive profits from war.
Delegation of Authority-The Act is Not Without a Standard. The
legislative function consists of the power to make policy and the power
to make detail. The latter power is delegable.50 The Renegotiation Act
is not unconstitutional on the ground that it provides a delegation of
authority to the 'executive branch of the Government1without a sufficient
standard or guide. Congress has clearly declared its policy in the
statute. It has stated that prices and profits in war contracts shall not be
excessive and that when they become excessive in the opinion of the
secretary of a given department, the secretary may eliminate them
through means specified in the act. 51
The standard by which profits are to be judged is unquestionably
broad. It is a standard of reasonableness, but even without additional
guides to determine when profits "may be excessive," this fact would
not seem to be fatal. The determination of the policy is not left to an
administrative body, as was true in the case of Schecter Poultry Corp. 'tJ.
United States 52 and Panama Refining 'tJ. Ryan. 58 There is no abdication
of the policy-making function of the legislature here. Nor is the situation like that in United States 'tJ. Cohen Grocery Company,54 where the
Supreme Court held the Food Control Act 55 of World War I unconstitutionally applied. In that case the statute imposed a penalgr of fine
or imprisonment or both for "any unjust or unreasonable rate ~r charge
49
Buck v. Kuykendill, 267 U.S. 307, 45 S. Ct. 324 (1925); George W. Bush
& Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317, 45 S. Ct. 326 (1925); Woman's Kansas City
St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City Mo., (C.C.A. 8th, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 593; American
Bond & Mortgage Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th, 1931) 52 F. (2d) 318.
50 See the forward looking opinion of Judge Rosenberry in State ex. rel. Wisconsin Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 229 N.W. 929 (1928).
51
Subsection (c) (1) of§ 403 as amended, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 983, provides:
"Whenever, in the opinion of the Secretary of a Department, the profits realized
or likely to be realized from any contract with such Department, or from any subcontract thereunder whether or not made by the contractor, may'"be excessive, the Secretary is authorized and directed to require the contractor or subcontactor to renegotiate
the contract price. When the contractor or subcontractor holds two 'or more contracts
or subcontracts, the Secretary in his discretion, may negotiate to eliminate excessive
profits on some or all of such contracts and subcontracts as a group without separately
renegotiating the contract price .of each contract or subcontract."
52
295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
53
293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
54 255 U.S. 81, 41 S. Ct. 298 (1921).
55 S~ction 4 of the Act of August 10, 1917,-c. 53, 40 Stat. L. 276 as amended
by§ 2 of the Act of October 22, 1919, c. 80, 41 Stat. L. 297.
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in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries." The statute provided
there a criminal penalty which the Court decided to be unconstitutional,
because it lacked a definite standard having to do with the definition of
a statutory crime. The statute did not concern itself with the standard
by which an administrative officer is to act in relation to the determination of profits and the procurement of war supplies at fair prices.56
The chain of cases beginning with Brig Aurora v. United States,5 1
has upheld many broad authorizations for administrative application of
a policy established by Congress where Congress has enunciated an intelligible principle. Certainly the principle set forth in the Renegotiation Act is understandable and clear. The statute does not leave to the
secretaries the power to legislate, but only the power to establish rules
and procedure for carrying out the express will of Congress. There is
not conferred upon administrative officers the power to make a law.
The act is merely a grant of authority or discretion as to its execution,
which must be exercised pursuant to the law through the application of
the standards therein to 'varying factual situations.
It is quite plain that Congress itself could not review the thousands
of war contracts to determine whether the profits were excessive and
has in that light delegated this task to the executive branch of the Government. Here the rule of "what is reasonably necessary in view of
what the 'times demand and of the end to be accomplished" obtains.58
Moreover the statute prescribed certain standards and statutory
guides to be considered by administrators in determining what profits
are excessive. Section 403 (c) (3) provides:

"In determining the excessiveness of profits realized or likely
to be realized from any contract or subcontract, the Secretary shall
recognize the properly applicable exclusions and deductions of the
56
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480 (1911) upheld a
statute which permitted the Department of Agriculture to determine the conditions
which operated to cause depredations of national forestry resources and subjected violators to puriishment.
57 7 Cranch (II U.S.) 382 (1813); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S. Ct.
495 (1892).
58 Frankfurter, "Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes," 29 HARV. L. REv.
638 at 686-688 (1916). In this regard see also Opp. Cotton Mills v. Administrator,
312 U.S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941); United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307
U.S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 933 (1939); cf.§ 2(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, Pub.
L. 421, 77th Cong., 2d sess., Act of January 30, 1942, 56 Stat. L. z'3 at 24; see also
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941) in relation
to the standard set down by the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, wherein the standard is that of fair labor practice which was held to be
acceptable by the Court.
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character which the contractor or subcontractor is allowed under
Chapter r and Chapter 2E of the Internal Revenue Code. In determining the amount of any excessive profits to be eliminated
hereunder the Secretary shall allow the contractor or subcontractor
credit for Federal income and excess profits taxes as provided in
section 3 806 of the Internal Revenue Code."
Section 403 ( d) states:
"In renegotiating a contract price or determining excessive
profits for the purpose of this section, the Secretaries of-the respective Departments shall not make any allowance for any salaries, bonuses, or other cqmpensation paid by a contractor to its
officers or employees in excess of. a reasonable amount, nor shall
they make allowance for any excessive reserves set up by the
contractor or for any cost incurred by the contractor which are
excessive and unreasonable. For the purpose of ascertaining
whether such unreasonable compensation has been or is being paid,
or whether such excessive reserves have been or are being set up,
or whether any excessive and unreasonable costs have been or are
being incurred, each such Secretary shall have the same powers
with respect to any such contractor that an agency designated by
the President to exercise the powers conferred by Title XIII of
the Second War Powers Act, I 942, has with respect to any contractor to whom such title is applicable. In the interest of economy
and the avoidance of duplication of inspection and audit, the services of the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall, upon request of each
such Secretary and the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury,
be made available to the extent determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury for the purposes of making examinations and determinations with respect to profits under this section."
It would not be practicable for Congress to outline in definite detail the methods for applying the principle of renegotiation. The
statute contemplates that its administration will be a part of the. procurement function of the departments procuring war implements. This
fact is apparent from the act's being limited to so-called war contracts.50
It would be just as impracticable to set forth detailed standards
with regard to this pricing function as it would to prescribe how fair
59
The Renegotiation Act includes only contracts and subcontracts made by or
for the War, Navy and Treasury Departments, the Maritime Commission and the
R.F.C. Sudsidiari~, engaged in war procurement,-Defense Plant Corporation, Metals
Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation, and Rubber Reserve· Company. The
Treasury Department is included primarily because of its lend-lease activities. The
War Shipping Administration is also conducting renegotiation through :eowers which
it derives from the act and the Executive Order which established it as an agency
separate and apart from the Maritime Commission as discussed in footnote I 5, supra.
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prices are to be determined by the departments in making their contracts.
Abuse of Administrative Discretion. To say that there is small likelihood of the act's being unconstitutional 60 is not to say that the contractor is without recourse against and protection from abusive and capricious actions of administrative officers. Confiscation is not a legal
vogue. The act permits a unilateral determination of excessive profits
by the secretary of the agency conducting the renegotiation.61 As the
act is presently administered, any ground for either injunction or damages is extremely remote. Nevertheless, should a finding of excessive
profits be made under renegotiation which would be so outrageous as
to constitute an abuse of discretion, a suit in equity would probably lie
to restrain the official from enforcing his findigg. Although this point is
distinguishable from the constitutional issue, the question of constitutionality might be collaterally considered in such circumstances.
If an official acts without ap:propriate authority, an action at law for
60
The issue may be raised as to the act's unconstitutionality for failure to provide
recourse to the courts. Upon careful analysis the act does not seem to be unconstitutional on this ground. There is no specific mention of judicial review of an administrative determination by one of the secretaries. It is believed that the silence of the
law in this regard does not impair its constitutional character. In the field of public
utility rate regulation, the courts have split as to the nature of the rate-making function.
Some say the function is legislative; others say it is judicial. It is doubtful if the courts
would reach any substantial disagreement in the case of determining excessive profits in
as much as such a determination would appear clearly to be judicial in nature when
measured by the usual standard of the administrative· procedures used in reaching the
desired result.
The law has not forbidden judicial review and in view of this fact, it would seem
that recourse to the courts is readily available. It has been held available for the review
of major and long-established activities of Government for which no remedy is provided
by statute; (Postal Fraud Order, Alien Deportation, Determination by the Land Office
of the extent of a land grant, etc.). Recourse to the courts has also been held available
where the remedy provided by statute is not an adequate substitute or does not include
the particular situation involved. The court would have to consider, of course, whether
granting judicial review would interfere with the proper administration of the act.
This is a matter of judicial self-limit~tion. A recent example is Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113, 60 S. Ct. 869 (1940), which denied the plaintiff a judicial review
of wages determinations under the Walsh-Healey Act. The Walsh-Healey Act itself
does not in terms either grant or deny judicial review of these determinations. No
constitutional obstacle to review of the issues was present in the case, but the Court
decided that the denial of a review in such instance was appropriately implied by legislative silence on the ground that the Government is free to contract with whom it
pleases and was free to do so before the act was passed. The Court further concluded
that the opportunity for judicial review would unduly interfere with the execution
of Government contracts.
61
Subsection (a) (3) of§ 403, 56 Stat. L. 797 at 982, provides:
"The terms 'renegotiate' and 'renegotiation' include the refixing by the Secretary
of the Department of the contract price.!'
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damages would be availabie to the contractor. In such a case it would be
necessary to show that the administrative determination of excessive
profits departed from the paths of authority which the statute provided,
and became then a wrong to the contractor as an action by an official
without th.e support of law. 62
Under present circumstances except with regard to those contracts
'in effect prior to the passage of the act there would be considerable difficulty in raising the question of the act's unconstitutionality in the courts.
In the first place, as already pointed out, the contracts between tl].e Government and most prime and subcontractors, contain renegotiation
clauses by which the contracting pa~ties are bound to renegotiate the
price of the contract. Having once agreed, it would appear upon proper
analysis, that any constitutional issue disappears. Moreover, if the contracts do not contain a renegotiation clause the doctrine of adoption
of an applicable existing statute into a contract would operate to make
the act part of the contract and the parties are equally bound and the
effect is the same as though a renegotiation clause were stated in the
contract. Excessive profits, are generally elii:ninated by agreement, a
point which has been made before, but where it is not possible for the
Government and the contractor to agree upon an amount to be returned, recapture of the amount determined will proceed upon the basis
of a unilateral determination by the Secretary of the Department which
conducted the renegotiation. It is cqnceivable, of course, that if a settlement should be proposed by the Government to the contractor which is
unfair, a case of abuse of discretion could be made and while an attack
upon the statute for any alleged unconstitutionality would seem to have
little chance of success, it is none the less true that the result in a given
individual case· might be upset for reaspns of abuse of administrative
discretion.
Determination of Excessive Profits-Administrative Standards and
Procedure. Under the authority delegated to the designated agencies
of the Government, these departments have formulated certain standards for the administration of this law. 63 Basic to the whole administra62

lnterstate Natural Gas v. Stone, 307 U.S. 620, 59 S. Ct. 1047 (1939).
The War, Navy and Treasury Departments and the Maritime Commission
joined to embody these standards which they had formulated in a joint statement.
Joint Statement by the War, Navy and Treasury Departments and the Maritime Commission, for Purposes, Principles, Policies and Interpretations under § 403 of the Sixth
Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, Pub. L. 528, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., approved April 28, 1942, as amencl.ed. This was published as of March 31,
1942 by the United States Government Printing Office. It described the purposes of
63
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tion of the act is the fact that the circumstances of each individual producer are considered separately. There is no formula which is applied
to every contractor. Instead each contractor's profits are measured for
excessiveness with reference to the particular circumstances under which
that contractor is producing.
In general the factors considered in determining the fairness of
contractors' profits fall into three groups: (I) efficiency with which the
contractor has performed his war contracts, ( 2) the risk which he has
undertaken in that performance, and (3) his peacetime earnings during
a "base period." The contractor's productive operations are compared
with those of other contractors in ascertaining the margin of profit to
which the contractor is entitled, and consideration is given to these
factors of efficiency:
"(a)
(b)
( c)
( d)
( e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

(j)

Price reduction and comparative prices.
Efficiency in reducing costs.
Economy in the use of raw materials.
Efficiency in the use of facilities and in the conservation of
manpower.
Character and extent of subcontracting.
Quality of production.
Complexity of manufacturing technique.
Rate of delivery and turnover.
Inventive and developmental contribution with respect to
important war products.
Cooperation with the Government and with other contractors in developing and supplying technical assistance to alternative or competitive sources of supply and the effect
thereof on the contractor's future peacetime bt;tsiness." 64

Applicable items of risk include such matters as the complexity of
the manufacturing technique with which the producer is confronted;
the source of operating capital-whether supplied by the Government
or the contractor; the rate of turnover and delivery; increases in the
cost of materials and wages; special charges such as cancellation charges
which have made the accomplishment of the contractor's operations
more difficult and expensive; delays in production because of difficulty
in obtaining raw materials. Certainly these considerations appear to be
entirely reasonable, and, in relation to the question of abuse of administhe act, the principles which are followed, and the factors considered in determining
the existence of excessive profits, as well as certain interpretations of the statute which
are of importance. It will hereafter be cited as "Joint Statement."
64
Joint Statement, p. 7.
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trative discretion, administration which adheres to these would probably give no ground for legal complaint.
EXEMPTIONS

Contracts and Sales Subject to the Statute. The Renegotiation Act
is applicable to all sales made either directly through prime contracts
or indirectly through subcontracts to the War, Navy, Treasury Departments, Maritime Commission, Defense Plant Corporation, Metals
Reserve Company, Defense Supplies Corporation, and Rubber Reserve
Company, upon which final payment-was made after April 28, 1942,
the effective date of the statute. Similarly such sales made either
directly or indirectly to the War Shipping Administration are subject
to renegotiation. 65 These sales are ordinarily called "renegotiable"; all
others are termed "non-renegotiable."
The term "subcontract" is defined as "any purchase order or agreement to perform all or any part of the work, or to make or furnish any
article, required for the performance of another contract or subcontract." 66 This definition does not recognize the distinction frequently
made in business between a contractor and what is known as a "supplier" or "material" man." It makes the law applicable to all agreements for the furnishing of services, articles, or other personal property necessary for the compl~tion of the contract regardless of how
remote they' may be from the prime contract itself.
The most recent amendment to the act brings within its purview
brokers, manufacturers' agents and dealers whose sales find their way
either into products being sold to the departments of the Government
named in the act or to manufacturers whose operations requir~ the use
of these items iri. the production of items,sold to the departments, irrespective of whether they perform services in relation to such sales or
hold them~elves ready to perform such services. 67
65 For a discussion of the War Shipping Administration's derivation of powers
with regard to renegotiation see footnote I 5, supra.
66
Subsection (a) (5) of§ 403, as amended.
Contrast this definition of "subcontract" with a more restricted definition applied
by the Board of Tax Appeals under the Vinsop.-Trammel Act in the recent case of
Aluminum Company of America v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 47 B. T. A.
543 (1942).
61 Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., 1st sess., approved July 14, 1943, amended subsec.
(5) of § 403 (a) to read as follows:
"The term 'subcontract' means (i) any purchase order or agreement to perform
all or any part of the work, or to make or furnish any article, required for the performance of any other contract or subcontract or (ii) any contract or arrangement (other
than a contract or arrangement between two contracting parties, one of which parties
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Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts are subject to the statute. And no
exemption is granted because of the fact that the particular items being
sold are under maximum price restrictions. The framers of the statute
do not appear to have thought that such maximum price restrictions
could be regarded as assurances that prices might not include profits
that were uru-easonable in relation to efficiency and risk.
is found by the Secretary to be a bona fide executive officer, partner, or full-time employee of the other contracting party), (A) any amount payable under which is contingent upon the procurement of a contract or contracts with a Department or of a
subcontract or subcontracts thereunder, or determined with reference to the amount of
such a contract or subcontract or such contracts or subcontracts, or (B) under which
any part of the services performed or to be peformed consists of the soliciting, attempting to procure, or procuring a contract or contracts with a Department or a subcontract
or subcontracts thereunder: Provided, That nothing in this sentence shall be construed
(1) to affect in any way the validity or construction of provisions in any contract with
a Department or any subcontract thereunder, heretofore at any time or hereafter made,
prohibiting the payment of contingent fees or commissions; or (2) to restrict in any
way the authority of the Secretary to determine the nature or amount of selling expenses under subcontracts as defined in (ii) herein, as a proper element of the contract price or as a reimbursable item of cost, under a contract with a Department or a
subcontract thereunder."
Formerly this subsec. (5) of § 403(a), 56 Stat. L. 797 at 982, read as follows:
"The term 'subcontract' means any purchase order or agreement to perform all
or any part of the work, or to make or furnish any article, required for the performance
of another contract or subcontract. The term 'article' includes any material, part, assembly, machinery, equipment, or other personal property."
Under this original language it was determined that brokers, manufacturers' agents
and dealers were only subject to renegotiation when they perform services or hold themselves out as being ready to perform services in relation to the sales which they make.
Such services are ordinarily of an engineering nature but frequently include help in
obtaining materials, advice with regard to the arrangement of plants or other services
relating to the manufacture or products relating to the departments. The amendment
effected by Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., 1st sess., approved July 14, 1943 and quoted
above was designed to make the sales of individual and corporate brokers and dealers
subject to renegotiation whether they rendered or either held themselves out ready
to render services regardless of whether they rendered or represented themselves as
being ready to render services of any nature.
To conform the act to this amendment, changes were necessary in other sections.
The words "in each subcontract for an amount in excess of $100,000" appearing in
subsec. (b) (3) of § 403 as amended, prior to Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., 1st sess.,
were struck out and inserted in their place is this phrase: "In each subcontract described in subsection (a) (5) (ii) and in each subcontract for an amount in excess of
$100,000 described in subsection (a) (5) (i)."
The first paragraph of subsec. (6) of § 403(c), 56 Stat. L. 797 at 984, of the
act was also amended and reads: ~
"(6) This subsection (c) shall be applicable to all contracts and subcontracts
hereafter made and to all contracts and subcontracts heretofore made, whether or not
such contracts or subcontracts contain a renegotiation or recapture clause, unless (i)
final payment pursuant to such contract or subcontract was made prior to April 28,
1942, or (ii) the contract or subcontract provides otherwise pursuant to subsection (b)
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Sales Exempted by the Statute. When the sales of a given contractor or su.bcontractor do not exceed $ roo,ooo for the fiscal year under
consideration, the contractor is granted an exemption by the statute.68
With regard to this exemption an interesting problem is raised in relation to the renegotiability of parent or affiliated companies. Subsection
( c) ( 6) provides that in determining whether the aggreg,t.te sales of a
contractor or subcontractor under contracts or subcontracts with the
departments exceed $roo,ooo, aggregate sales shall be considered as
those made by the contractor or subcontractor "and by all persons under
the control of or controlling or under common control with the contractor or subcontractor." Thus it will be seen in the case of a parent
and subsidiary company where the parent has had $90,000 of renegotiable sales in the fiscal year being renegotiated and a subsidiary has had
$560,000 of renegotiable sales in the same period, that the parent and
subsidiary are subject to the statute, irrespective of whether they are
considered on a consolidated basis or not. This would be so because the
contractor and subcontractor are under common control.
Sales completely paid for. before April 28, 1942 are not subject
to the statute, but if final payment has not been received under a contract prior to that date, all the sales under that contract are subject to
renegotiation. 69
and (i), or is exempted under subsection (i), of this section 403, or (iii) the aggregate sales by and amounts payable to the contractor or subcontractc:,r and all persons
under the control of or controlling or under common control with the contractor or
subcontractor, unqer contracts with the Departments and subcontracts thereunder (including those described in clauses (i) and (ii) of this subsection (6), but excluding
· subcontracts described in subsection (a) (5) (ii) do not exceed, or in the opinion of
the Secretary will not exceed, $100,000, and under subcontracts described in subsection (a) (5) (ii) do not exceed, oi- in the opinion of the Secretary will not exceed,
$25,000, for the fiscal year of such contractor or subcontractor." '
68
Subsection (c) (6) of § 403 as amended.
As amended by Pub. L. 149, 78th Cong., l~t sess., approved July 14, 1943,
subsection (c) (6) of § 403 set forth supra, reduces this exemption with regard to
the dollar volume of sales to $25,000 in the case of brokers, ma.nufacturers' agents·
and dealers.
Since some contractors act as agents for some manufacturers and as dealers for
others the applicat.ion of this exemption will frequently require inclusion of sales
wherein the contractor acted as a dealer even though those sales may be less than
$100,000 if the contractor's sales as an agent exceed $25,000. This is true because
a contractor is exempt only if his aggregate sales do not exceed $100,000 and. his
aggregate compensation for procuring renegotiable contracts is not in excess of $25,000.
Hence if a contractor's sales as a principal exceed $100,000 for the fiscal year being
renegotiated the contractor's commissions for procuring renegotiable contracts would
fall within the act and would be renegotiable even though they were less than $25,000 for that fiscal year.
·
69
Joint Statement, § J-PAB-2(a), amended. See footnote 28, supra.
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Sales to other departments of the Federal Government, to local
and municipal governments, to local.political subdivisions, to state governments, and to foreign governments, are not renegotiable.10
Contracts for certain materials are exempted froi:n renegotiation by
subsection ( i) ( 1) (ii). There it is provided that the statute shall not be
applicable to "any contract or subcontract for the products of a mine, oil
well or gas well, or other mineral or natural deposit, or timber, which
has not been processed, refined or treated beyond the first form or state
suitable for industrial use," and the secretaries "are authorized by joint
regulation to define, interpret and apply this exemption." By joint
resolution under date of February r, 1943, the term "exempted products" has been defined and all contracts or subcontracts with respect to
these items are not renegotiable under the statut~. 71 If a contractor or
subcontractor refines, processes, or treats an exempted product so as to
change it from its exempted state to a non-exempted state, the exempted product is ordinarily treated as an item of cost at its established
sale or market price for the purpose of renegotiation. Thus in the case
of an integrated steel company the market price of the pig-iron, pigiron being an exempted product, is ordinarily regarded as a cost in the
renegotiation of the integrated company and as such is deducted in de.
termining the profits arising from the company's sale of steel.
Exemption by Administrative Order. Subsection (i) (2) o_f the
statute permits the secretary of the department concerned, within his
discretion, to exempt certain contracts, or subcontracts from all or part
of the provisions of the act. Contracts which might be subject to such
discretionary exemption include contracts or subcontracts which are to
be performed outside of the territorial limits of the continental United
States or in Alaska.12
The secretary may also exempt from the operation of the act for a
given period or periods any contracts or subcontracts which he believes
Subsection (i) (1) (i) of § 403 as amended.
Exemptions listed in Joint Regulation interpreting and applying subsec. (i)
(1) (ii) of § 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act,
1942, as amended by § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, dated February 1, 1943,
War Department Procurement Regulations 1f 1291. Pursuant to authority delegated
to the Quartermaster General through subsec. (i) (2) (ii) of § 403 as amended and
War Department Procureipent Regulations, 1f 1204-1 208 ( 2), the Quartermaster General has exempted certain contracts calling for the sale of fresh fruits, fresh veg~tables,
dairy products, poultry, meats, fish and sea foods, frozen vegetables, frozen fruits,
bread and other bakery products, potato chips, compressed yeast, shell eggs and margerine. War Department Procurement Regulations, 1f I 292.
72
Subsection (i) (2) (i) of § 403 as amended.
70
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to be so drawn that profits can be determined with reasonable certainty.
The secretary may also exempt contracts and subcontracts, the profits
of which can be determined with reasonable certainty when the price is
established, such as "certain classes of agreements for personal services,
for the purchase of real property, perishable goods, or commodities the
minimum price for the sale of which has been fixed by a public regul3;tory body, of leases and license agreements, and of agreements where
the period of performance under such contract or subcontract will not be
in excess of thirty days." 73 Unless specifically exempted, however, all
contracts which may be thus exempted, remain subject to the statute and
are renegotiable.74
Exempted Subcontracts Under an Exempted Prime Contract.
When a prime contract is exempt from renegotiation the question occurs
whether the subcontracts thereunder are likewise exempt. In the case of
exemptions made mandatory by the statute subcontracts as well as prime
contracts are exempted from its operation.75 Such exemptions apply to
contracts -made by a department having renegotiating authority with
"any other department, bureau, agency or governmental corporation
of the United States or with any Territory, possession, or State or
73

Subsection (i) (2) (ii) of§ 403 as amended.
This is the interpretation by the Joint Statement as set forth therein at § JPAB-2(c), page 14. This certainly appears to be the correct analysis in as much as
the specific action is required by the statute for these exemptions to be effective.
The authority to exempt from renegotiation contracts and subcontracts which
are to be performed outside of the United States or in Alaska, has been delegated by
the Secretary of War to the_ Chiefs of the Supply Services as well as the Material
Command, Army Air Forces. The Secretary of the Navy ,has likewise delegated such
an authority to the Undersecretary of the Navy. This authority is in relation to
subsection (i) (ii) of the act. It is plain that this authority may be exercised with
respect to existing contracts as well as to contracts that are to be executed and performed in the future. Similar authority has been delegated to the Director of Procurement by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Joint Statement, § J-PAB_-2(c) (i), p. 14,1.
75
Joint Statement,§ J-PAB-2(d), p. 15.
Joint Statement, § J-PAB-2(b) (i) at p. II reads as follows:
"Subsection (i) (1) (i) of the statute provides that the statute shall not apply
to any contract by a Department with any other department, bureau, agency or governmental corporation of the United States or with any Territory, possession, or State
or any agency thereof or with any foreign government or any agency thereof. Contracts between such agencies or governmental corporations and private contractors,
and subcontracts thereunder, are likewise not subject to renegotiation, except in those
instances where the agency or governmental corporation is acting as a direct agent
for a Department. In. these instances, the contract is deemed to be with the principal
for whom the agency or governmental corporation is acting as direct agent, and not
with the agency or governmental corporation, and a_ccordingly, if otherwise subject
to renegotiation, will not be exempted."
74
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any agency thereof or with any foreign government or any agency
thereof." 76 And when an agreement is made for the products of mines,
oil or gas wells and other mineral and natural deposits defined in the
act, it makes no difference whether the agreement is by way of a prime
or subcontract.77 Moreover, when the prime contract itself is exempted
by the statute that exemption acts as an umbrella for all subcontracts
made under it and they are also exempted. Subcontracts made under
prime contracts whi@h are exempted by the discretionary acts of the
secretaries are not, however, protected. From the standpoint of statutory construction this interpretation seems sound. Sip.ce the secretaries
are specifically authorized to exempt both prime contracts and subcontracts, it would seem that exemptions granted by administrative order
should apply only to the particular contracts to which they are given.
If a prime contractor has less than $100,000 worth of sales and is
exempted from renegotiation by subsection ( e) ( 6), this exemption has
no application to subcontractors furnishing articles under contracts with
the prime contractor.
Real Estate Exemption. It will be noted that the term "article"
in subsection (a) (5) includes "any material, part, assembly, machinery,
equipment, or other personal property." It was apparently the intention of Congress to exclude subcontracts for the sale of real estate,
though not similar prime contracts. Originally there seemed to be some
confusion as to the application of this exemption. It was apparently
thought that the sale of an item by a subcontractor which was personalty
at time of its sale, but later became affixed to realty, was not subject to
renegotiation because in its final character the item sold was real estate. 78 Careful analysis, however, leads to the conclusion that renegotiation of the subcontract involved is not precluded by the affixation
of the "article" to the real estate.79 The wide variation in the law of
76

Subsection (i) (1) (i) of § 403 as amended.
Subsection (i) ( l) (ii) of § 403 as amended.
78
Joint Statement,§ J-PAB-3, p. 15, dated March 31, 1943.
79
The Joint Statement, § J-PAB-3 under date of March 3 I, 1943, has been
amended as of July 10, 1943, and recognizes this analysis. This section of the Joint
Statement now reads:
"Subcontracts for real property excluded.-The term 'subcontract' as used in
Section 403 is defined to mean any purchase order or agreement to perform all or any
part of the work, or to make or furnish any article, required for the performance of another contract or subcontract. The term 'article' is defined to mean any 'material,'
by inference at least, thereby excluding real property sold as such. It follows, therefore,
that an agreement for the sale of real property, even though 'required for the performance of another contract or subcontract' is not included in the definition of the term
77
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fixtures in the forty-eight states is well-known. It 'is generally said
that whether an article is intended to be a fixture or remain personalty
depends upon the intention of the parties. Local taxing authorities,
however, frequently consider such items as cranes and boilers to be
realty for purposes of taxation even though these things are held to be
personalty under the terms of chattel mortgages or conditional sales
agreements for the purpose of enforcing the lien of the mortgagee qr
upholding title of the equitable or legal owner. It seems unlikely that
Congress intended that the varying local laws should govern in deciding whether property is real or personal for purposes of renegotiation. The act is national in scope and it must surely be recognized
that the success of its ·administration will, of necessity, require the ap'subcontract' as used in subsection (c) of the statute. Thus, if a contractor or subcontractor 'furnishes' land or buildings 'required for the performance of another
contract or subcontracts' (i.e. for the perfomance of a renegotiable contract or subcontract), the contract or subcontract for the 'furnishing' of the land or buildings is
not subject to renegotiation. This does not, however, exclu_de from renegotiation contracts or subcontracts for the sale, furnishing or installation of machinery, equipment,
materials or other personal property made or furnished or install~d for use in the
processing of an end product or of an article incorporated in an end product even
though such machinery, equipment, materials or other personal property may for other
purposes be deemed to become real property by reason of its installation in a building or
other affixation to the realty.
"The situation giving rise to this exemption of real property must be carefully
distinguished from .the case where the 'making or furnishing' of real property is the
subject matter of a prime contract (or a subcontract thereunder) with one of the Departments or with a contractor acting as the agent or instrumentality for one of the Departments. Thus a contract with a Department or any agent or instrumentality thereof
for the construction of a building, and all subcontracts thereund~r, are subject to renegotiation, unless the subject matter of the contract is existing real property as' distinguished from articles which become real property in the course of the performance
of the contract or subcontract.
"It follows, therefore, that if the contract is for the construction of improvements
on or to real property, and if the Government acting through a Department is to obtain
title to such property either immediately or ultimately (i.e., contracts for plant and
facilities), then such contract, including all subcontracts thereunder for the furnishing of
services, or of articles such as building materials and structural steel which are personal
property when furnished, but which became real property during the course of construction, are renegotiable, as well as subcontracts for the furnishing of all machinery
and equipment installed in the building.
"If, however, a contract( other than a contract or subcontract to make or furnish
machinery or. equipmerlt or other personal property, including articles to be affixed
to the realty, to be used in the processing of an end product or of an article incorporated
in an end product) is for the construction of real property for a contractor or subcontractor for the purpose of performing a renegotiable contract or subcontract, then
such contracts and subcontracts thereunder are not subject to renegotiation even though
improvements may be covered by Certificates of Necessity, so long as a Department is
not either immediately or ultimately to acquire title thereto."
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plication of uniform criteria in determining whether contracts are renegotiable or exempt from its operation.
The standard which the departments have adopted makes reference
to the local law of fixtures where the property is located or transferred
unnecessary. Subcontracts for the sale of machinery, equipment or other
personal property are not excluded from renegotiation for the reason
that such items may be· deemed to be real estate for other purposes
because of their a:ffixation to the realty. If such articles are essentially
machinery or equipment in the commonly accepted sense, regardless of
the character of their annexation to the realty, or if they are clearly
other personal property at the time of the sale, the renegotiability of
subcontracts therefor will depend upon whether the item is used in
the processing of an end product or of an article incorporated in an end
product.
The problem of exempting contracts for the sale of real estate was
further clarified by an express exemption granted by the War and Navy
Departments for both prime and subcontracts which are for the purchase or lease of any interest in real property,8° and the exemption
recognizes that the character of the article at the time of its sale determines whether it is to be exempted as being real property or whether
it falls outside of the exemption as being personalty for the purposes
of renegotiation. Therefore sales of articles which are real estate at the
time of their sale by the subcontractor must be distinguished from sales
of articles which are personalty at the time of their sale and later become affixed to realty. The ~ormer are non-renegotiable and the latter
renegotiable. The departments have taken the position that if the
Government will ultimately acquire title to a building to be constructed
or to improvements upon real estate under a contract with one of the
departments having renegotiating authority that the prime contracts as
well as the subcontracts thereunder will be subject to renegotiation.
However, if it is not contemplated as part of the transaction that title
to the property will vest in the Government, the contracts and subcontracts for the improvement to real estate or the construction of buildings on such property will not be subject to renegotiation even though
such work is done for the performance of contracts or subcontracts
which are in themselves renegotiable. The chief difficulty with this concept arises in the cases where a prime contractor under a contract with
one of the departments has made subcontracts wherein there will be
80
This appears in a directive dated October 8) 1943 signed by the Undersecretary of War.
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furnished to him completed buildings or other improvements upon real
property, title to which he will in turn pass to the Government.81 If
the necessary conclusion from the departments' position is that these
subcontracts are subject tp renegotiation, apparently this is achieved by
regarding the prime contractor as merely a conduit of title and thus
considering the articles which had the character of personalty at the
time they were sold under subcontracts as being then sold directly to
the Government. In as much as many Government contracts have been
made wherein the agreement is that the prime contractor will obtain
title to the realty which he will later pass to the Government, this distinction is of some importance.
When facilities are to be acquired 'under the ordinary cost-plus-afixed-fee contract it is generally intended that the prime contractor shall
act as a conduit of title and that title to equipment and facilities purchased under the contract will ultimately rest in the Government. The
- arrangement under the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract is such that the
contractor frequently appears to be the Government's agent. Yet Alabama v. King & Boozer,82 and Curry v. United States,83 determined
that cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractors are not entitled to federal immunity from state taxation and are not agents of the Federal Government but independent contractors. These cases make it difficult, if not
impossible, to regard the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractor as an agent
of the Federal Government and sales to such a contractor as sales to
the Federal Government. Hence sales of real estate by a subcontractor
to a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee prime contractor are probably not renegotiable
even though the nature of the prime contract indicates that title to the
realty will ultimately rest in the Government.
Problems and Methods of Segregation of Sales and Allocation of
Costs. In furnishing the information upon which renegotiation is to be
conducted the contractor is expected to segregate those sales which are
renegotiable, that is, those that hav:e been made directly or indirectly
to the departments named, and those which are non-renegotiable. In
many instances it is difficult, if not impossible, for the contractor to
Note this language from Joint Statement, § J-PAB-3, amendment dated June
24, 1943. See note 79 supra: "The situation giving rise to this exemption of real
property must be carefully distinguished from the case where the 'making or furnishing' of real property is the subject matter of a prime contract (or a subcontract
thereunder) with one of the Departments or with a contractor acting as the agent
or instrumentality for one of the Departments."
82
314 U.S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 43 (1941).
88
,
314 U.S. 14, 62 S. Ct. 48 (1941).
81
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determine exactly the end use of the articles which he sells and so he
must resort to some method calculated to give a reasonably accurate
result, such as the sampling of a reasonable number of orders or spot
checking sales. In as much as the figures furnished the Government
are the representation of the contractor and must remain his representation, in order to avoid any possible liability that might arise from an
intentional or unintentional misrepresentation,84 he should be careful
to disclose the method relied upon in achieving the result. It should be
made clear to the Government's representatives and made a part of
the record that the figures representing the segregation of sales were
compiled on the basis of the methods described. If the method employed is acceptable to the Government, then the renegotiation can
proceed without any further delay.
ALLOWABLE CosTs, ExcLus10Ns AND DEDUCTIONS

Exclusions and Deductions. In general the administrators of the
Renegotiation Act are following the principles of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with regard to allowing exclusions and deductions from
the contractors' gross profits. Thus in cases where there is a doubt as
to whether a deduction of an item or its exclusion from profit will be
granted, contractors can usually be guided by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue's treatment of their particular problems. The Price Adjustment Boards are not, however, bound to consider these matters in the
same light as does the Treasury, except to the extent to which subsection ( c) (3) of the statute is effective. Subsection ( c) (3) provides that
"the properly applicable exclusions and deductions of the character
which the contractor or subcontractor is allowed under Chapters r and
2E of the Internal Revenue Code," shall be recognized. The phrases
"properly applicable" and "of the character" must have been used
Subsection (e) of § 403, as amended.
United States v. Decker, U.S. District Court of Maryland, July 24, 1943,
C.C.H. WAR LAw SERVICE, 1f 29, 021, involved a rehearing after a conviction
under an indictment for violation of subsec. (e) of § 403 as amended, in the furnishing of "statements of actual costs of production" which were false and misleading.
The defendants were officers of a corporation which was being renegotiated by the
Navy Department. The Navy Department's auditor was referred to the contractor's
accounts which the defendant officers knew contained statements and items not properly
chargeable to renegotiable contracts. The defendants contended that their actions did
not constitute the "furnishing of a statement'' and that the officers of the corporation
were not "persons" within the meaning of subsec. ( e) of § 403 as amended. However, the evidence in this case indicated that one of the officers had a much greater
degree of guilt than the other and with relation to the former a motion for retrial
was granted, conviction of the other being upheld.
84
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adyisedly in order to give the administrators of the law authority and
discretion in applying this portion of the act.
Salaries, Bonuses and Commissions. Salaries, bonuses, commissions
or other compensation are items of cost and deductible from gross
profits but not if they are in excess of a reasonable amount.85 In determining whether they are excessive, the salaries of the officers in the
pre-war years, the volume and complexity of the undertaking during
the year under consideration, and amounts being paid to officers in
other companies of similar size and nature are considered.
Reserves. Reserves for the liquidation of post-war risk, reconversion and rehabilitation are not allowed.86 Reserves for bad debts and
physical shrinkage of inventory are usually permitted in renegotiation
if they are ~owed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for federal tax
purposes, and if it has been the policy of the company to establish such
reserves.
Interest. Where borrowed capital is being used for financing the
production of renegotiable contracts and subcontracts the interest on
such capital is deductible in renegotiation. The time when such capital
is borrowed is immaterial. The Internal Revenue Code 81 permits this
deduction and therefore it must be recognized in renegotiation to the
extent that such capital is applicable to the financing of renegotiable
contracts' or subcontracts.88
Allowances for A,dvertising. With regard to allowances for advertising expenditures, the statement of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue made on September 29, 1942, has been adopted as the policy
of the departments in renegotiation'. 89 Advertising designed to keep
the company's name before the public is a deductible item and may be
allocated as a cost to renegotiable business;' but advertising designed to
sell a specific commercial product must be allocated as a cost to commercial business. Amounts spent for advertising in past years are used
Subsection ( d) of § 403, as amended.
This policy was dictated by Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, under date of March 6, 1942, by letter to Undersecretary of the War and
Navy Departments. Joint Statement, § J-PAB-6,
20.
87 lnternal Revenue Code § 23(b), U.S. C. (1940), tit. 26, § 23 (b).
88 Section J-PAB-5 (d), p. 18.
.
89 Wartime tax avoidance. Statement of the Secretary of the Treasury to Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, May 28, 1942, p. 7, states the Treasury's
attitude on this matter. An excellent discussion of the Treasury Department's position with regard to the deduction of advertising expense is to be found in a release
by the Association of National Advertisers, Inc., dated August 28, 1942. Excerpts
of this release are in I C.C.H. S:rANDARD FED. TAX SERVICE, § 19.23(a)-1 (1943).
85

86
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as a guide in determining how much ought to be spent in advertising
during the war. And whether these expenditures have a reasonable
relation to the size of the business and its production, is also considered
in determining if allowance should be made for them.
Amortization Deductions. Section 124 of the Internal Revenue
Code permits the amortization of war facilities under Certificates of
Necessity over a sixty months' period. In view of the provision of the
Renegotiation Act which requires the recognition of the "properly applicable exclusi~ns and deductions of the character which the contractor
or subcontractor is allowed under Chapters 1 and 2E of the Internal
Revenue Code," 90 it is perfectly clear that the amortization deductions
permitted by section 124 for purposes of taxation are also deductible
in renegotiation. Thus normal depreciation is considered as an item of
cost and an amount rep.resenting the di:ff erence between the accelerated
amortization and the normal depreciation for accounting purposes is a
deduction.
In as much as section 124 provides for an acceleration of the amortization period in the event that the emergency is declared to be ended
in a period of less than five years, the taxpayer is permitted further to
accelerate the amortization deductions over the shorter period. For
example, if termination of the emergency period were declared at the
end of a three-year perio~ instead of a five-year period as selected for
the base in the statute, the taxpayer could then go back to the point
when he commenced amortization deductions and take the deductions
over the three-year period at thirty-three and one-third per:, cent per
year instead of the twenty per cent yearly as would have been the case
in the five-year period.
The acceleration of the amortization period is a matter of great
concern to contractors who ha,ve invested large sums of money with the
expectation of taking advantage of the amortization c;leductions under
section 124. Such an acceleration is specifically permitted for purposes
of taxation. But is it permitted for purposes of renegotiation where the
contractor has entered into an agreement of settlement? Will such
agreements be reopened so as to permit the contractor to have the
advantage of the additional deductions which are permitted for tax
purposes? The departments have decided that renegotiation agreements will not be reopened to give the contractor the advantage of the
acceleration of the amortization period. Administratively the contrac90

Subsection (c) (3) of § 403 as amended.
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tor's ability to reopen the agreement embodying the renegotiation set. tlement depends upon there being included in the agreement a reservation permitting a reopening in the event of an acceleration of the amor- ,
tization period. As will be seen later, the form of agreement prescribed
by the departments does not provide for any such reopening; and in
view of the policy expressed, it is unlikely that such a provision will be
agreed to on the part of the Government. Th~ phrases "properly
applicable" and "of the character" would seem to place upon tenuous
grounds any right of the contractor' to a reopening based upon subsection (c) (3) even though it be assumed that this section has been
adopted as a part of the agreement.
Inventory Write-off-Charges for Plant Rearrangement-Accelerated Depreciation and Deferred Maintenance. A contractor is not
permitted to write off commercial inventory and charge the cost of this
inventory to the renegotiable business. The cost of converting plants
to war work however, is a deductible charge in so far as such rearrangement does not constitute a permanent addition to the plant.91 The departments in this regard are following the policy of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.
Although .each case presents its own problem of accelerated depreciation, acceleration will generally be permitted in renegotiation if
the Treasury Department has also allowed this as an additional charge.
However, the departments are not bound to accept the Treasury's
opinion in this regard and, if it appears to-the administrators that there
is an actual exhaustion and depletion of facilities over and above the
normal rate, an acceleration of depreciation may be permitted even
without a Treasury decision ·on the question.
All maintenance expenditures made during the fiscal year to keep
machinery operating are allowable· as items of cost. These items normally are to be c_harged against the earnings of the fiscal year in which
'it was necessary to make the expenditure to keep the machine in operation. The problem of deferr~d maintenance arises because many companies carry as a part of the cost of production a fund established on
the basis of production for the replacement of perishable tools and other
related items. In as much as the expenditure of this sum which accrues
as production proceeds, does not normally take place precisely within
the company's fiscal year and is therefore carried over in part into the
next fiscal year, it is usually allowed as an item of cost by the Treasury.
91

Joint Statement, § J-PAB-5(a), p. 17.
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This procedure has also been adopted in renegotiation. Demands for
greatly increased production in extended periods of operation have,
however, caused some companies to set up large sums of money as a
reserve for deferred maintenance. Circumstances which seem to demand the establishment of these larger reserves have been of a sufficient duration in many instances to permit the establishment of a
policy in this regard predicated upon actual necessity and production
experience. But the departments have not approved this type of reserve
where the company's history has not indicated that such an accrual
method has been normally followed, that is, in cases where the sum set
up is arbitrary.
War Losses as Deductible Items. War losses have been suffered by
many companies during the period subject to renegotiation. The problem has arisen as to whether they are allowable as charges against renegotiable business. In the light of subsection (c) (3) war losses, as
provided in section I 2 7 of the Internal Revenue Code, are allowable
if the loss of such property bears a reasonable relation to the performance of the contract or subcontracts which are being renegotiated.
Carry-Over and Operating Losses. Sections 23(s) and I22 of the
Internal Revenue Code permit a carry-over of a net operating loss for
the first and second preceding taxable years. If any part of this loss is
reasonably related to the contracts and subcontracts being renegotiated,
the departments regard it as a properly applicable deduction in renegotiation. The part determined so to be applicable is charged against
the renegotiable sales, and the balance is charged against the commercial or non-renegotiable business of the contractor.92
Since section I22 of the Internal Revenue Code also permits the
"carry-back" of net operating losses that occur in subsequent years because of tax adjustment for prior years, the problem once again arises
as to the reopening of a final settlement agreement in order to permit
the contractor to take advantage of this measure. The departments have
assumed the same position on this matter as they have in regard to
section I 24 of the code. Renegotiation agreements will not be reopened
to give any consideration to net losses which occur in periods following
the renegotiation period, settlement for which has been embodied in
the agreement.98
Consideration of Parent and Subsidiary on a, Consolidated Basis.
Although section I4I of the Internal Revenue Code gives affiliated
92
98

Joint Statement, § J-PAB-5(b), p. 17.
Joint Statement, § J-PAB-5(b), p. 18.
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groups within the meaning of section 141(d) the right to file a consolidated tax return, it does not ~eem that any such permissive rights
obtain with respect to renegotiation. The rights delineated in section·
141 relate to the returns in the payment of the tax rather than to the
matters of exclusions and deductions which subsection ( c) (3) of the
Renegotiation Act requires the departments to recognize in renegotiation. Nevertheless fairness to the contractor and a practical recognition
of the fact that many affiliated groups are ~perated as though they were
one organization with very little regard to technical corporate separation has resulted in the adoption of a policy which ordinarily permits
affiliated groups to be considered upon, a consolidated basis.94
For purposes of taxation.it is especially important even where an
atfiliated group is being considered on a consolidated basis, that there
be an allocation of the amount of excessive profits to be recovered from
the income of each company in the group. For if there is merely a general imposition of liability for the return of excessive profits on the
affiliated group and no separate liability is fixed, there is a possibility
that the Treasury Department will not permit either the parent or the
subsidiaries in the group deductions of excessive profits for federal in-'
come tax purposes. Thus the renegotiation agreement must set forth
specifically the allocation of the excessive profits, as determined in renegotiation, between the parent and the subsidiaries of the affiliated
group.
TAX EFFECT OF RENEGOTIATION
With regard to the effect of renegotiation on federal taxes the Internal Revenue Code differentiates between renegotiation prior to and
after the filing of th~ taxpayer's return. 95
Renegotiation made before the filing of a tax return operates to
reduce both the contractor's sales and income, on the theory that the
contractor sold goods at prices higher than should have been charged
and that the difference between what he charged and what he should
have charged is the amount which has been determined to be excessive.
Hence, if a contractor's net profit before renegotiation and before taxes
is $10,000,000 and his sales are $100,000,000 and it is agreed that $2,94 This policy is within the discretion of the departments, however, and should
cases arise where a consolidated consideration of an affiliated group in renegotiation
would permit a contractor to realize unfair or exorbitant profits, the privilege of
going forward. on such a basis would probably be denied py the departments.
95 Section 3806 of the Internal Revenue Code, U. S. C. (Supp. II, 1942), tit.
26, § 3806.
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shall be returned to the Government through renegotiation,
then his sales become $98,000,000 and his profit before taxes is $8,000,000. Taxes will be paid upon the basis of $8,000,000.
If the tax return has been filed by the contractor prior to renegotiation, he must then apply to the local agents of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a computation of the tax. The bureau computes the tax
upon the return as filed and if a copy of the return is not available, the
computation is made upon a certified copy of the return and is furnished
under certification by the bureau to the renegotiating agency. The
amount of the tax as computed by the bureau is then regarded as a
credit against the amount to be paid on renegotiation. For illustration,
if $2,000,000 is to be paid to the Government as excessive profits and
the return has been filed on the basis of earnings in the amount of $10,000,000, the credit to be applied against' the renegotiation settlement,
assuming that the contractor is on an eighty per cent basis, would be
the amount by which the federal income and excess profits taxes are
decreased through the elimination of the excessive profits for that fiscal
year. Thus, in the illustration at hand the credit against renegotiation
would be $1,600,000, being the difference between the tax on $10,000,000 and on $8,000,000.
It should be remembered that if renegotiation is completed after
the filing of the tax return, renegotiation has the effect of a redetermination of income and therefore the post-war refund provided for in
section 780, the carry-over and carry-back provisions of section 122 of
the Internal Revenue Code and all other matters relating to federal
taxation are affected. The taxpayer's income is regarded as being
redetermined to the extent of the refund determined in renegotiation.
Section 780 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes the post-war
refund of excess profits tax. In considering the computation of credit
under section 3 806, it must be remembered that the post-war refund
will be reckoned by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the basis of
the contractor's redetermined income after renegotiation. Thus section
96
78 I (b) of the Internal Revenue Code operates to reduce the post-war
000,000

96

Section 781(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, U. S. C. (Supp. II, 1942),
tit. 26, § 78 I (b), provides:
·
"Effect of Refunds.-If an overpayment of the tax imposed by this subchapter
for any taxable year for which a credit is provided in section 78o(a) is refunded or
credited to the taxpayer under the internal revenue laws, the credit, if any, provided
in such section then existing in favor of the taxpayer shall be reduced by an amount
equal to 10 per centum of the excess of the tax imposed by this subchapter on the
basis of which such tax (in respect of which the internal revenue refund or credit ,
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refund to the extent that it is attributable to any tax refund or credit
- where a post-war refund would be payable. It seems quite clear that
the credit under section 3 806 constitutes a refund within the meaning
of section 7 8 I (b). This is the policy that has been adopted by the
Treasury Department. In the example above therefore, assuming that
the corporate taxpayer had an excess profits tax credit of $2,000,000,
it will be subject to an excess profits tax of, $7,200,000 and the post-war
refund would have been $720,000. This post-war refund, however, will
- be reduced to $540,000 on the basis of income as redetermined after
renegotiation involving a recapture of $2,000,000.
Many taxpayers are making claims with reference to sections 122,
72 I and 722 of the Internal Revenue Code and have filed their returns
based upon the assumption that their claims with respect to these sections are valid and will be allowed. Other taxpayers have filed returns
upon the basis that certain disputed items will be ultimately decided
in favor of the taxpayer. As already pointed out the credit will be computed upon the return as it is filed. If it is later determined, however,
that these claims or any of the disputed items in the return are either
denied or decided unfavorably to the taxpayer or if any action taken
by the Treasury has the ultimate effect of granting the taxpayer a
credit less than that which is allowable, then the amount which is the
difference between the credit allowed and that which is allowable will
be treated by the Treasury Department as an overpayment for the taxable year concerned and will be refunded or credited to the taxpayer
as provided in section 3806 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code.97
If the contractor is doing business as· an individual or partnership
the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 .ss gives rise to difficult problems
with regard to the application of section 3806.99 Under a ruling by the
was made) was previously computed and paid, over the tax imposed by this subchapter as determined in connection with the determination of the amount of the
overpayment. In such a,case, if such credit provided in section 78o(a) is less than
the amount by which it is required to be reduced, or if there is no such credit then
existing in favor of the taxpayer, the excess of such amount over the amount of such
credit, if any, shall be carried forward as a charge against the taxpayer to be applied
in reduction of a subsequent credit under section 78o(a); and if no such subsequent
credit is made in favor of the taxpayer, the amount of such charge (without interest)
shall be paid by the taxpayer to the United States or the amount of bonds previously
issued to the taxpayer under section 78o(b) shall be adjusted on account of such
charge."
See I. T. 361 l in INT. REV. BuL., No. 12, June 25, 1943, p. 7.

"R
98

.

Pub. L. 68, 78th Cong., 1st sess., approved June 9, 1943.
99 A partnership, of course, files only an information return and the Federal
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Treasury Department 100 the substantial effect of section 3 806 of the
Internal Revenue Code in relation to the Current Tax Payment Act
of 1943 as it is applied to individuals and partnerships, is to place such
taxpayers in the same position whether they file their tax returns before
or after renegotiation. In as much as the obligation to pay taxes as imposed by
chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code upon l 942 income
I
was discharged effective as of September 1, 1943 by virtue of sections
6a and 6b of the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, the Treasury Department has held that no credit is available to individuals in relation
to renegotiation conducted for the year 1942.101 Even though the
Treasury will permit no credit under section 3806 to be applied in the
renegotiation of individuals for the taxable year 1942, in computing
the tax imposed by chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code during the
taxable year 1943 wherein taxes for the years 1942 and 1943 are to be,
compared as provided in the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, such
individuals are allowed to reduce the amount of the 1942 income to
the extent that any profits therein are determined to be excessive as the
result of renegotiation for that year. This is permitted on the condition
that such excessive profits are paid by the taxpayer at the close of the
taxable year which follows the taxable year of 1943. 102
Since the return of profits found to be excessive in renegotiation is
not treated as a reduction in l 942 income for the p,urposes of determining a credit to be applied against the amount to be returned under
renegotiation for that year, individuals and partnerships may find themselves in a difficult financial situation through having to pay taxes currently upon 1943 income as well as having to make payments with
regard to renegotiation of the 1942 income. In recognition of this
problem the renegotiating agencies are taking steps to permit an extention of the time within which individuals or partnerships may make
refunds of profits found to be excessive under renegotiation for the·
year 1942. This move is designed to prevent serious impairment of
the cash and working capital position of such persons. Iri working out
this policy, attention will be paid to the time and amount of tax payIncome Tax is imposed only on the individual incomes of the partners. Therefore,
the tax credit to which a partnership is entitled under § 3 806 will be the aggregate
of the separate credits to which each of the individual partners is entitled as a result
of a reduction in their individual profits from the partnership by the elimination
therefrom of excessive profits which came from renegotiable partnership sales.
100
I. T. 3619 in INT. REv. BuL., No. 16, August 25, 1943, p. 6.
101 Id. at 7.
102
Ibid.
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ments which would have been required on the excessive profits had
· they not been refunded.
Also of importance. to the taxpayer-contractor is the treatment of
repayments under renegotiation for purposes of state income taxes.
Although many states fail to take any recognition of the Renegotiation
Law either in their legislatures or through their departments of taxation, at least nineteen states have now taken action in this reg;rd.108
THE RENEGOTIATION AGREEMENT
Once a determination of excessive profits is agreed upon by the
Price Adjustment Board and a given contractor, the final step is the
embodying of that settlement in a written agreement. This agreement
is final and conclusive according to its terms and any contingent liability
that obtained with regard to a contractor's company prior to it may be
eliminated with regard to business covered by the agreement.10' If it
is determined that a contractor has not realized excessive profits within
the meaning of the statute, the departments may give the contractor
a clearance for th~ period under renegotiation. This clearance may be
. embodied in a final·agreement or a clearance notice.105
CoNSENT OF AssIGNEE To THE RENEGOTIATION AGREEMENT
Renegotiation may require the amendment of. existing contracts
to give effect to the price reductions agreed upon between the Government and the contractor. The Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 106
108 As of June 15, 1943, action had been taken by the following states: Alabama,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Connecticut. The Philadelphia Receiver·of Taxes has also taken action. Reference is made to STATE TAX REVIEW, Vol. 3,
(C.C.H.) for May 28, 1943, June 15, 1943, December IO, 1943, and December
22, 1943.
104 By virtue of subsec. (c) (4) of § 403 the secretary of the department conducting the renegotiation may make such "final or other agreements with a contractor
or subcontractor for the elimination of excessive profits and for the discharge of any
liability for excessive profits under this section, as the Secretary deems desirable .•••
Any such agreement shall be final and conclusiye according to its terms; and except
upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance or a wilful misrepresentation of a material
fact, (i) such agreement shall not be reopened as to the matters agreed upon, and
shall not be modified by any officer, employee, or agent of the United States; and
(ii) such agreement and any determination made in accordance therewith shall not
be annulled, modified, set aside, or disregarded in any suit, action, or proceeding."
This language was embodied in the act by amendment. Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong.,
2d sess., approved October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 984.
105
Subsection (c) (4) of§ 403 as amended.
106
Act of October 9, 1940, Pub. L. 811, 76th-Cong., 3d sess., 54 Stat. L. 1029.
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permits the assignment of Government contracts to financing institutions. Where these contracts have been assigned, the question arises
as to whether the assignee's consent to such contractual changes is necessary for him to be bound thereby.
The Assignment of Claims Act of I 940 provides that "any contract entered into by the War Department or the Navy Department
may provide that payments to an assignee of any claim arising under
such contract shall not be subject to reduction or set-off, and if it is
so provided in such contract, such payments shall not be subject to
reduction or set-off for any indebtedness of the assignor to the United
;:itates arising independently of such contract." The clause authorizing
assignment of Government contracts which is usually included in such
instruments states that payments thereunder shall not be subject to
reduction or set-off for the assignor's indebtedness to the ·united States
which arises ihdependently of the contract.
Where profits from an individual contract which has been assigned
pursuant to the Assignment of Claims Act of I 940 are found to be
excessive in renegotiation and recapture of those profits is to be achieved
either wholly or in part through a reduction in the price of the items
to be delivered under such a contract, it is not unlikely that this change
in the contract would be binding upon the assignee without his consent.
But where renegotiation is conducted on an overall basis so that the
profits flowing from all of the contractor'_s renegotiable contracts are
considered as a group,101 reductions in the price of one or several of
such contracts for the purpose of recapturing excessive profits may call
for a return of profits under one contract that did not flow entirely
therefrom. In such a case it may appear that the language of the Assignment of Claims Act of r 940 quoted above would prevent a reduction in the contract price from being binding upon the assignee without
his consent except to the extent that such a reduction would be attributable to excessive profits arising out of the particular contract in question
rather than from other contracts. This conclusion seems sound unless
the Renegotiatiqn Act 108 which was passed after the Assignment of
Claims Act of I 940 has repealed the latter by inference with respect
to this particular point. 109 Complicating this inquiry still further is the
101

As authorized by subsec. ( c) ( 1) of § 403 as amended.
Subsection (c) (2) (i) of § 403, 56 Stat. L. 797 at 983, as amended gives
the secretary authority to eliminate excessive profits "(i) by reductions in the contract price of the contract or subcontract, or by other revision in its terms."
109
United States v. Borden Company, et al., 308 U.S. 188, 60 S. Ct. 182
(1940).
108
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constitutional issue of whether the Renegotiation Act can be applied
to effect price reductions in contracts assigned before its passage. Where
third parties have acquired rights under congressional authority of the
Assignment of Claims Act of I 940 prior to the enactment of the Renegotiation Statute a different result may be required from that reached
·where renegotiation is applied retroactively to contracts with the Government which are not assigned.
The solution to this problem of whether the assignee's consent to
alterations caused by renegotiation in assigned contracts is required before he is bound thereby raises so many complex and conflicting issues
that it merits a separate treatment apart from this article. Suffice it to
say here that' the answers to the questions that are raised concerning
the application of the Renegotiation Act· in effecting price reductions
for the recapture of excessive profits in assigned contracts are so uncertain as to make it advisable to obtain the assignee's consent when
amending assigned contracts. This course of procedure is indicated
although the United States in particular cases may have rights under
the contract to vary amounts payable without the consent of either the
assignor or assignee. To the extent that the assignor's approval to the
changes is required, like approval should be obtained from the assignee.
METHODS OF RECAPTURE

Various methods may be utilized by the departments to eliminate
excessive profits under contracts and subcontracts. The terms of the
contract or contracts may be revised as to price or otherwise; there may
be a withholding of any amounts due to the contractor or subcontractor;
excessive profits under a subcontract may be eliminated or recaptured
by directing the prime contractor ·to withhold for the Government
amounts which he owes to the subcontractor under the subcontract; the
contractor or subcontractor may repay in cash any amount of excessive
profits determined by the department; and the departments may employ any combination of these methods that they deem desirable in
administering the act. In as much as the settlement agreement in renegotiation may embody one or more of these methods, agreements usually
call for a cash refund or a reduction in prices or some combination of
the two. Ordinarily, if only a cash refund is involved, there is no adjustment in the contractor's prices for the elimination of the excessive
profits determined, although he will, when necessary, be asked to reduce prices on future deliveries so as to prevent the realization of
excessive profits in future years. On the other hand, if the contractor
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reduces his contract prices on future deliveries under fixed price contracts, the reduction must be made so that excessive profits will be eliminated through the delivery of units at the reduced price by the end of
the fiscal year involved. This situation normally arises only in those
cases where renegotiation is undertaken on estimated figures before the
close of the fiscal year under consideration. Since renegotiation is essentially a re-pricing function, the departments are placing great emphasis upon price reductions.
When subcontracts are involved in renegotiation prices may be
reduced with the provision that the prime contractor pass on the equivalent benefit to the Government through a corresponding reduction in
the prices of its prime contracts or through a direct cash refund to the
Government. The act as originally drawn gave rise to the fear that a
subcontractor even though he had made price reductions as agreed
through renegotiation might still be liable for excessive profits if the
Government, for some reason or other, had failed to receive the benefit
of the reduction. An amendment to the act, however, makes it clear
tliat a contractor or subcontractor is required to refund excessive profits
only if they have been "actually paid to him." 110
To recover any excessive profits which have been determined the
departments are authorized to bring action in the appropriate courts.111
Sureties under any contract or subcontracts which are renegotiated are
specifically relieved from any liability for the repayment of profits
found to be excessive under the statute.112 And an agreement on the
contractors' part to reduce prices for future deliveries is normally becoming a part of the renegotiation settlement. The Undersecretary of
War made a statement recently before the House Ways and Means
Committee that producers whose prices contain substantially excessive
profits are operating with much less risk than those whose prices are
free from such excessive profits.
In the light of this statement, it seems probable that contractors
who operate on a smaller margin of profit can expect a better treatment
in renegotiation that those whose margins of profit are excessive. The
110
Subsection (c) (2) of § 403 as amended. See also, Patterson, Robert P.,
U.S. Congress, Hearings before Senate Subcommittee of Committee on Finance, 77th
Cong., 2d sess., on § 403 of Pub. L. 528 (September 29, 1942) p. 3 at p. 10, and
Marbury, William L., U. S. Congress, Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance,
77th Cong., 2d sess., on § 403 of Pub. L. 528. (Revised.) (September 22 and 23,
1942). Page I.
111
Subsection (c) (2) of § 403 as amended.
112
lbid.

,
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Undersecretary also indicated that while the results of renegotiation
with respect to r 942 business of any contractor do not establish prece- ,
dent because of the many variances in operating conditions, none the
less, the r 942 settlements for renegotiation give the contractor a guide
which should aid him in the determination of his prices for the delivery
of war goods in 1943.118 .
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND FILING OF STATEMENTS

The Renegotiation Act will continue in effect during the period of
the present war and for three years after its termination.114 The life
of the statute, however, must be distinguished from limitations of time
after which renegotiation regarding any particular contract may be
commenced. Subsection ( c) ( 6) provides that no renegotiation of a
contract price shall be commenced more than one year after the close
of the fiscal year within which completion or termination of the con, tract or subcontract, as determined by the secretary, oc~urs. This is; in
effect, a statute of limitations.
This particular limitation provision raises the problem as to when
renegotiation is "commenced" within the meaning of the subsection.
Although there is no guide in the statute with regard to this question,
118

Patterson, Robert P., in Hearings before House Ways and Means Committee,
78th Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 2324, H.R. 2698, and H.R. 3015 (September 20,
1943), p. 807 at 812 said in part:
·
.
"In •many cases, particularly in the case 6f subcontractors, where hundreds-or
even thousands-of individual products are involved, it has not been P.ossible for the
Department to examine in detail and currently reprice all individual products with
respect to the year 1943. However, the Government has advised the contractors that
excessive profits must be eliminated by them through reductions •in the prices which
are being currently charged for their individual products. In order to be fair, and
at the same time to make this policy practicably effective, the War Department has
announced two correlative principles:
"First, war contractors who operate on a clearly excessive margin of profit and
maintain price levels which result in the realization of a substantial amount of excessive profits in 1943 will be treated in renegotiation on a basis which corresponds
to the relatively small degree of risk of loss which they have incurred. Those contractors who reduce their prices to a point where they are realizing. only a reasonable
profit will be treated with comparable lil5erality by reason of the additional risk which
they have assumed as a result of operating on a narrower margin of profit.
"Although it is recognized that the results of renegotiation for 1942 business
cannot be regarded as an established precedent for the results of 1943 operations, since
there are necessarily many variances in the conditions and results of operations in
individual cases as well as generally, nevertheless the res_ults of 1942 renegotiations
do afford to the contractor a general guide with respect t6 the establishment of 1943
price policies in accordance with the foregoing principles."
114
Subsection (h) of § 403 as amended.
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the only logical assumption is that renegotiation commences when the
contractor is notified by the department to furnish certain information
relative to the statute. If the analogy from the usual statute of limitations is applicable here, it would seem that any action designed to give
notice for the purpose of saving rights would be adequate and that
meetings with the contractor need not be undertaken to start the running of this statute of limitations.
The act makes provision not only for a limitation period with relation to individual contractors but also permits insulation from its e:ffect
by fiscal years.115 Thereby contractors and subcontractors may limit the
time during which renegotiation of a given fiscal year or years may be
commenced, and if renegotiation is not begun within this time, they
are relieved from any requirement to renegotiate with reference to
these years. Thus the contingent liability which arises from the law
may be removed after the passage of a period of time. To set up this
limitation contractors and subcontractors holding renegotiable contracts
must file statements of actual cost and other financial statements for
the relevant prior fiscal 'year or years with the secretary of the department concerned.116 The secretary then has one year within which to
give the contractor or subcontractor written notice that in his opinion
the profit to be realized from all or any of the contracts or subcontracts
may be excessive. A date and place for the initial conference must be
set and the conference must be held within sixty days after notice is
given. If notice is not given and renegotiation commenced 117 within
these periods or if notice is given and the renegotiation is not commenced within the sixty-day period, liability for renegotiation with regard to the fiscal year or years covered by the statements is discharged.
LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS FOR SETTLEMENTS MADE PURSUANT
TO RENEGOTIATION

Much attention has been paid to the possible liability of directors
for making an agreement of settlement pursuant to the Renegotiation
Act. It is argued that if the officers and directors of a given company
agree to the recapture of profits fpund to be excessive pursuant to the
provisions of the act, they might be held liable in an action brought
Subsection (c) (5) of § 403 as amended.
Joint Regulation prescribing the form for Filing of Financial Data by contractors and subcontractors as provided by subsec. (c) (5) of § 403, etc., as amended
by § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, dated February I, 1943.
117 Note the distinction between notice and commencing renegotiation.
115
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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

by the stockholders. It is difficult to understand the theory of this
argument. Reliance for the success of any such action brought against
the directors would have to rest upon some alleged impropriety on the
part of the officers and directors in entering into the renegotiation agreement.
The courts, it is true, have come a long· way from the case of Spering's Appeal,118 which relieved directors of liability for mistakes of
judgment, no matter how gross, if they acted in good faith, and within
the confines of their authority. Directors can no longer hide behind a
claim of good faith in defense of their actions when they have not
exercised reasonable skill and judgment, and the test would now seem
to be not merely one of a director's good faith in taking action within
the scope of his authority, but also whether he had under the circumstances, displayed a reasonable judgment.119 None the less it seems
difficult to regard ·officers' and directors' accepting a renegotiation settlement which does not abuse the tenets of reason as either a breach of
trust or lacking in exercise of reasonable judgment.120
•
In considering whether or not directors have exercised reasonable
judgment in the conduct of renegotiation and in agreeing to make a
refund, important factors are the circumstances of war, the use of renegotiation as an instrument of national policy and procurement, and
its acceptance by others in the business community.121 Also to be considered is the situation where a company refuses to sign renegotiation
agreements. In this regard recognition would have to be given to the
118

71 Pa. St. II (1872).
Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (188p).
12
°For a discussion of the duty of corporat~ directors to exercise business judgment, see an article under this title by Rudolph E. Uhlman, 20 BosT. UNiv. L. REv.
488 (1940).
.
121
On June 30, 1943, Mr. Maurice Karker, Chairman, War Department Price
Adjustment Board, in a statement on Renegotiation of War Contracts made in Hearings b_efore the House Naval Affairs Committee, 78th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to
H. Res. 30, at p. 1004, reported the status of War Department Renegotiation as of
May 29, 1943 to be as follows:
"Up to May 29, 1943, 12,622 contractors have been assigned for renegotiation
including 9,842 to the War Department; 2,419 to the Navy Department; 67 to the
Treasury Department; 289 to the Maritime Commission; and 5 to the War Shipping
Administration. Of the 9,842 cases assigned to the War Department, written or
oral agreements had been reached up to that time with 1,879 contractors, or 19.9%,
939 of which were covered by agreements executed for the Government and fully
processed. At that time 4,207 contractors were engaged in renegotiation. Renegotiation had not as of that_date begun in the remaining 3,756 of the cases assigned
to the War Department."
119
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fact that the control of procurement and the bulk of the nation's business is in the hands of the departments having renegotiation authority.122
What effect does the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the
act have upon any potential liability of officers and directors who agree
to refund profits earned by a corporation? If the directors have conceded the unconstitutionality of the law or have been advised by counsel
that the act is unconstitutional, it may well be that a return of profits
to the Government under renegotiation is a breach of trust under the
theory of Dodge v. Woolsey. 128 This case involved a suit in equity
commenced by the stockholder of a bank against the tax collector of
Ohio, a bank, and bank directors, to restrain them from the collection
and payment of an Ohio tax on the ground that the tax was unconstitutional. The tax was admittedly unconstitutional because it infringed
upon a previous statute of the legislature fixing the amount of tax that
the bank should pay in lieu of all other taxes. The bank directors conceded to the stockholders the illegality of the tax but refused to resist
payment because of the obstacles to contesting the tax in the state courts
of Ohio. In granting the injunction sued for, the Court held that directors who fail to contest the validity of a statute which they have
conceded to be unconstitutional are guilty of a breach of trust.
But if there i_s no concession of unconstitutionality certainly directors are under no obligation to contest the constitutionality of a statute
requiring the corporation to pay out money. It is ordinarily a matter
of internal discretion with the directors whether they will resist the
payment of amounts claimed by a government or comply with such
requests.12' The propriety of their decision rests once again upon
122 The FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN publish~d by the Federal Reserve Board
for April, 1943, at p. 288 reported that as of March, 1943, the physical volume of
the nation was at least 65%.
128

18 How. (59 U.S.) 331 (1855).
case of United Cooper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Cooper Co., 244
U.S. 261 at 263-264, 37 S. Ct. 509 (1917), contains this language:
"Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of
action for damages, is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal
management and is left to the discretion of directors, in the absence of instruction by
vote of stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra oires
the corporation, except where the directors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a
breach of trust •••"
And the Court in Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S!
~ The
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whether the directors and· officers have acted in good faith and with
reasonable judgment.125 An:d if they have, it would seem that they
cannot be held liable for reasonable mistakes of a law.126
Another factor to be considered in determining whether directors
are guilty of a breach of trust and can be held liable or enjoined in
equity from the payment of a settlement agreed upon in renegotiation,
is that 1;Jie weight of public opinion against a corporation which resisted
elimination of excessive profits during war might have a disastrous effect upon the companfs future sales. If the directors, under the circumstances present at the time the corporation is -asked to agree to return
profits, would ordinarily, in the reasonable conduct of the corporation's
business, seek the advice of counsel as to whether the corporation is
legally required to make a refund under renegotiation if requested, or
whether the act is unconstitutional, then such advice should be so~ght.
But if the making of a refund under renegotiation be considered a matter involving business judgment rather than one of law then such advice
of counsel would seem unnecessary. .
The weight of the circumstances of the war, which require a profit
limitation measure and the customary acceptance of the act by business
generally, make it highly unlikely that any liability can be placed upon
directors for making refunds or ·reducing prices pursuant to renegotiation agreements. No impropriety can be attached to actions in this
regard if good faith and the dictates of reasonable care and judgment
are followed and the usual methods prescribed by laws and regulations
for the renegotiation procedure are adhered to.
REMEDIES WHERE A CONTRACTOR FAI'LS OR REFUSES TO RENEGOTIATE

Unquestionably, the position of the contractor who refuses to enter
into renegotiation agreements is of interest to many producers. The
departments have taken the position that they desire to conclude re255, 23 S. Ct. 157 (1903) determined that it was within the discretion of the
Board of directors whether or not to contest certain license taxes.
·
125 Certainly directors and officers are under no obligation, if they act in good
faith, to contest the liability of a la~ which is later declared to be unconstitutional.
And Day v. Codman, 39 N.J. Eq. 258 (1884), determined that a fiduciary should not
be charged with the payment of municipal taxes, where the assessment was declared unconstitutional after the tax had been paid, when the payment was not only made in good
faith, but upon the advise of counsel.
126 Hodges v. New England Screw Company, I R.I. 312 (1850), affirmed on
1ehearing, 3 R.I. 9 (1853).
'
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negotiation with the contractor on the basis of a mutual agreement, and
they will exert every effort to reach such an agreement.121
As a matter of practical policy, it is unlikely that many contractors
while the war is continuing would decline to enter into a renegotiation
settlement. The practical remedies available to the Government are
powerful instruments of persuasion. Moreover, most contractors, regardless of the weapons in the hands of the Government to bring
recalcitrant producers into the renegotiation fold, are earnestly and
sincerely desirous of reaching a fair settlement.
But if a contractor did decide that he would not or could not agree
to a proposed settlement, the Government would have available several
remedies at law. The secretary is empowered to make a unilateral determination of e:x;cessive profits in the case of any contractor.128 After
a finding by the secretary that the amount in question constituted excessive profits the Government could proceed to collect this amount in
several different ways.120 If the producer had contracts with the Government containing amounts sufficient to liquidate the amount of ex- .
127

Joint Statement, p. 5.
If however, the contractor refuses to agree to a finding made by the Price Adjustment Board and which has been considered by the board to be reasonable, the
Joint Statement issued by the department states:
"In the event it becomes impossible to reach a mutual agreement, the case is
then referred to the official of the Department or the Commission to whom authority
has been delegated under the statute, who gives consideration to the use of such
special measures as he may deem necessary or advisable."
128
Subsection (a) (3) of § 403 as amended.
129
The procedures which the departments may follow in the instance of the
unilateral determination of excessive profits and the collection thereunder are likely
to be along the following lines:
1. The entry of a finding with regard to the fiscal year under renegotiation
determining the amount of excessive profits.
2. The direction of withholding under the contractor's prime contracts with
the Government as well as through other Government prime contractors whereunder
the contractor is a subcontractor.
,
3. When necessary to insure reasonable future prices the conduct of an audit
to determine the fairness of the contractor's current prices and the requirement that
the contractor should make delivery of future goods which include only a fair margin
of profit as determined by the secretary. If the company is not willing to accept
orders at such prices then it is likely that mandatory orders will be placed requiring
performance when other suppliers are not available. If there is further refusal to
perform, of course, the contractor's plant can be taken over by the Government.
4. Renegotiation of the next period subject to renegotiation will be immediately
instituted to the extent to which it has been completed and a unilateral determination
of the excessiveness of profits in that period will be entered and collections made upon
the basis of such a determination.
'

600

MICHIGAN' LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

cessive profits, collection could be made .through withholding such
sums, either for goods delivered or to be delivered. This remedy would
seem to be available both with regard to prime contractors and subcontractors. Recapture of excessive profits under these circumstances could
also be made by an action in the 'federal courts. This remedy is specifically provided for in the statute.130
If the contractor chose to challenge the legality of the secretary's
finding with regard to excessive profits, he could seek an injunction to
restrain the secretary from enforcing his finding, as has been discussed
before; ·or the contractor could permit an action to be brought against
him in the federal courts for the recovery of the amount in question.
And if the secretary undertook to collect the amount found to be excessive through withholding sums due to company under prime contracts with the Government or under subcontracts through other prime
contractors, the company could bring an action for recovery of amounts
so withheld. The defense of the Government in such an action would
be the secretary's findings pursuant to the Renegotiation Act. This
would probably be met by an argument on the part of the contractor
that the law was unconstitutional or that the secretary's findings were
so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

If renegotiation is recognized for what it is-an instrument of war
procurement, a kind of past pricing arrangement-the statute and administrative interpretations become more easily understood. The law
was not conceived nor is it applied as a punitive measure. It was not
conceived nor is it applied as a tax measure. In the enactment of renegotiation, Congress fully recognized that it is primarily a part of the
procurement procedure. The view is taken that renegotiation is as
essential to good purchasing in time of war as is free and open competition in time of peace.
A·s is true of most laws depending upon'broad administrative action
for• the accomplishment of a given purpose, the act lodges great discretionary power in its administrators. This, of course, creates uncertainty and a contingent liability upon the earnings of business. The
hardship suffered by business in this respect, however, appears to be
offset by the :flexibility of renegotiation which permits the application
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of the statute to each producer individually. This flexibility would seem
to guarantee advantages outweighing any such uncertainty.
There is only one phase of major importance that would cause
renegotiation to fail. Because of the size of this undertaking, it is going
to be difficult to cover all contractors subject to renegotiation within a
reasonable time. Yet it is obviously essential to the success of the act
that all contractors falling within its scope must be renegotiated within
a reasonable time after the determination of their earnings. The contingent liability created by the statute must be removed within sufficient
time to permit business to proceed with its plans of production under
circumstances of the greatest certainty possible. The administrators of
renegotiation are making real efforts to speed up the procedure to
accomplish this purpose. These efforts appear likely to bear fruit.
Certain important changes in the law have been recently proposed.
It has been urged that the determination of excessive profits be made
after rather than before taxes; that reserves for post-war rehabilitation
of plant and equipment be permitted, a change that will require an
alteration in the tax laws so that such reserves may be free from taxation; that the present $100,000 exemption be changed to exclude from
renegotiation those companies having less than $500,000 of otherwise
renegotiable business. T_he renegotiation agencies have opposed the
adoption of the first two suggestions but have favored the last one and
it appears likely that the present exemption of $ :ioo,ooo will be raised
to $500,000 for the fiscal year ending after June 30, 1943.
There has been some agitation to re-define "subcontract" so as to
include only subcontracts for the article, work, services, building, structure, improvement or facility contracted for under the prime contract or
for articles to be incorporated in the item contracted for under the
prime contract. The effect of such an alteration of the law would be to
eliminate from renegotiation those persons who do not manufacture
articles that become a part of or furnish services that directly relate to
products finally sold to one of the departments having renegotiating
authority. The elimination of standard commercial articles from renegotiation has been urged. Such changes are not regarded favorably by
the departments.
A review of any determination of excessive profits by either the
Court of CJ.aims or the Tax Court for all determination of excessive
profits made by the secretaries is another suggested alteration in the
statute. An amendment to the act which would permit post-war re-
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habilitation to be considered as an item of cost has been proposed. It is
essential, of course, that if such an amendment is to be made effective it
would hav~ to be through an alteration in the tax laws. And for that
reason it·seems fundamental that the place for such a change to be
effected is in the tax statutes. Even though there have been sound arguments for the recognition and allowance of such reserves in renegotiation no substantial benefit could accrue to business unless the tax statutes
were altered in this way.
Although some of these changes appear likely to be made in the act
it is not probable that its fundamental concepts will be affected. It
seems likely that renegotiation is going to be in operation as long as
the war continues. f
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